

HILLARY'S SECRET LOVE ■ McCain's MELTDOWN ■ HAGEE'S ARMY

AUGUST 27, 2007

The American Conservative

Sending Your **One Child** To **War?**

The Geopolitics of
Declining Birth Rates



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FRED HEAD

Michael Dougherty uses a fig-leaf argument to contend that Fred Thompson is all personality, devoid of ideas, and merely trying to assume the “brand” of Ronald Reagan (July 16).

First, Thompson’s weaknesses pale in comparison to the competition’s. The complaint about his background as a lobbyist is “inside baseball” and won’t register with 99 percent of the public.

Second, Dougherty has no basis for claiming that Thompson lacks ideas. He has a consistent conservative voting record, has acknowledged his mistake on McCain-Feingold, and has addressed the issues *du jour*—immigration and the fight against Islamofascism—with the right responses.

Third, Dougherty couldn’t be more wrong in claiming that the bedrock principles for which President Reagan and the conservative movement stand are “obsolete.” Since when are low taxes, limited government, a strong defense, and the promotion of American culture and sovereignty obsolete? Contrary to Dougherty’s assertion that the Right faces an “entirely new set of questions,” we face the same old issues along with a few new ones, many of which are old issues packaged differently. Instead of the Soviet Union, we now face Islamofascism, which one could acknowledge regardless of his position on Iraq. Thompson is not living in the past, but seeks to deal with the present through traditional values and principles enunciated by, yes, Reagan and many others.

Finally, Dougherty fails to recognize that one can’t create a candidate; the conservative movement has to dance with the ones that are available. Comparing Thompson to the ghost of Reagan or to some perfect non-candidate is not an argument.

We are not substituting “nostalgia for judgment,” but merely seeking the best all-around candidate to carry the torch in the battle against the forces of evil and

ignorance as represented by the ultimate Democrat standard-bearer. Conservative critics must quit looking for perfection and coalesce behind a candidate who is sufficiently principled to energize the base and who possesses the requisite persona to attract the general voting public. Fred Thompson is that man.

ROBERT BRANTLEY

Alexandria, Va.

RATIONED CHOICE

Thank you *TAC* and Professor Payne for the cogent essay on the sensibility of self-disciplined, responsible non-insurance (July 16). This is, perhaps, the first substantial, certainly the best, essay I’ve ever seen on the fundamental hang-up of almost all health-insurance regimes.

Payne takes a realistic position on a subject the Right has not sensitively argued and the Left seems unwilling to consider, namely the insatiability of health-care demands. I would support a publicly funded medical care system—if there were a reasonable way to do the inevitable rationing. When one considers the chicanery rife in virtually all insurance systems, on the one hand, and the predictably unlimited appetite for “free” medical services, on the other, one sees the nature of the impasse.

At age 58, I think that I have a fair shot at another decade of reasonably healthy, productive life. But so many of us have been spoiled by the notion that “medicine” entitles us to any and all attempts to live forever. Science and technology have allowed human greed one more avenue for expression, and that immaturity shows in the way we have come to think about medical care.

My hat is off to you, Dr. Payne, for your candid view on this confounding subject, and thanks again, *TAC*, for continuing to surprise me with the cast and haul of your net.

DAN TREECRAFT

Spokane, Wash.

CREDITING NIXON

With regard to William Lind’s essay (July 30), it is increasingly clear to me that the still-despised Richard Nixon was a far better man and president than he has ever received credit for being. While living through the Watergate scandal, I thought that he deserved all that he brought upon himself. But in the light of history, his misdeeds seem trifling in light of the actions of his immediate predecessors (and some of his successors). The “scandal” seems but a bootstrapping party staged by the media to abet Democrats who could not possibly let Nixon get credit for successfully ending the Kennedy/Johnson catastrophe of intervening in a populist uprising against the colonial power of France.

So many of the points Lind now raises about Iraq ring true to me. We destabilized a territory that was never a nation in the first place. We were unable to establish or maintain order from the beginning or fight the inevitable insurgency effectively. And worst of all, we childishly bought into the con game that the Chalabi-led Iraqi National Congress was going to waft magically into power, erasing overnight centuries of sectarian chaos and bringing Camelot II to a place that has progressed little beyond the Age of Nebuchadnezzar. Ah, hindsight. But were there not supposed to be abler, smarter people who get paid more than I do who might have figured this out before it all happened?

Thanks for your well-thought, focused, and probably ignored-by-all-politicians essay,

GENE WRIGHT

Laguna Niguel, Calif.

In keeping with our usual publishing schedule, TAC’s editorial offices will be closed for the next two weeks—a well-earned break notably shorter than the Iraqi Parliament’s. We will reopen Aug. 13 and return to print Aug. 23.



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[WAR]

REGRESS REPORT

The latest National Intelligence Estimate drew ominous conclusions. In a departure from its 2006 version, which said that al-Qaeda was suffering, this year's report found that the terrorist organization had reconstituted in the northern regions of Pakistan and is positioned to carry out major strikes inside the United States. Just after the report's release, a new videotape of Osama bin Laden surfaced, indicating that he is alive and able to communicate with the Muslim world.


The NIE avoided political conclusions, but the facts underscore the striking incompetence of the Bush administration's effort to combat al-Qaeda. Why is bin Laden, whom Bush vowed to get "dead or alive," enjoying sanctuary in Pakistan? Why is he more able than ever to recruit terrorists? The answer is plain: when U.S. troops had al-Qaeda on the run, the administration pulled our forces off the hunt, shifting them to the futile invasion of Iraq. Toppling Saddam was the course neoconservatives had obsessively lobbied for long before 9/11, and Bush proved eager to oblige. The U.S. has since poured blood and treasure into Iraq, creating a fresh recruiting front, and spawning a new group, "al-Qaeda in Iraq," that did not exist before the occupation.

Osama bin Laden clearly owes George W. Bush and his Iraq War architects a note of thanks—the president couldn't have pursued more accommodating policies. Whether the American people share that gratitude is another matter.

[JUSTICE]

C'EST MOI

Four words the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee should never have to say to the nation's chief law-enforcement officer: "I don't trust you."



That was the scene when Atty. Gen. Alberto Gonzales was questioned about pressuring his hospitalized predecessor to reauthorize the administration's domestic surveillance program. The senators' disdain crossed party lines: "Your credibility has been breached to the point of being actionable," the panel's ranking Republican told him.

But the AG didn't blink. He knows that devotion to his powerful patron—not his middling legal credentials—keeps him in a job. In a recent interview with the *Financial Times*, Gore Vidal commented that Gonzales "thinks he's Attorney-General of Mexico." "No, that is not a racist remark," the novelist averred, anticipating the easy put down. Those familiar with cronyism's corrosive effect on the rule of law will glean his meaning—and wince.

Loyalty, far more than skill, seems to be the Bushian shibboleth. Called to testify about the U.S. attorney firings, former White House Political Director Sara Taylor told the long-suffering Judiciary Committee, "I took an oath to the president, and I take that oath very seriously." "Did you mean, perhaps, you took an oath to the Constitution?" Chairman Patrick Leahy suggested. "I, uh, yes, yeah, you're correct, I took an oath to the Constitution, uh, but, what..." "I know the president refers to the government being his government," Leahy con-

tinued. "It's not." That may have been news to Ms. Taylor.

But Bush is unbowed. The White House has just announced that it will order the Justice Department not to prosecute administration aides for ignoring congressional subpoenas. Expect full compliance from those sworn to uphold the president—and his monarchical notion of justice.

[DIPLOMACY]

WANNA BUY A WAR?

If only Baghdad could be more like Coke. We'd "like to teach the world to sing," but our branding seems to be a bit off.

According to a 211-page report commissioned by the U.S. Joint Forces Command—"Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation"—the occupation might be salvaged if we could just find the right advertising strategy.

Author Todd C. Helmus argues that the "American brand" hasn't been integrated into the lives of Iraqis as something positive. (Ignore that checkpoint on the corner.) He promises to help us "deliver a message about what democracy is." Liberty under law? Inalienable rights? That's so last century. Helmus counsels instead that the Pentagon try customer-service-speak: "we will help you."

Our government was able to purchase this wisdom from the RAND Corporation

for the bargain price of \$400,000. During the Cold War, RAND was all about boring game theory and scary nuclear stuff. In the age of terror, they've moved into the much hipper business of global branding.

Call it victory by jingle—but don't bet on Iraqis buying.

[ELECTION]

DEBATABLE STATEMENTS

We've been following the Democratic debates and note that sometimes small asides reveal more about general ideological temperament than heavily polled and consultant-tested set pieces.

For instance, it is a liberal cliché to assert that America is "the richest country in the world." This invariably prefaces a statement about a social program—excellent free health care for everybody, for example—that America could "easily" afford. Obama and Hillary used the line in Charleston; John Edwards makes it a regular refrain.

America ranks high in per capita wealth (though several European states do better). But absent from the Democrats' recitation of "affordable" programs is any recognition that if we spent all the money they would cost, our economy couldn't sustain even top-ten status. Neither do they pay any attention to the structural underpinnings of being a wealthy country, such as maintaining manufacturing capability and a technological edge.

In the most recent exchange, a memorable moment came when Joe Biden, whose lukewarm opposition to the Iraq War has not shaken his belief that the American military can solve any problem in the world, no matter how culturally or strategically remote. Asked whether we should send troops to Darfur, Biden answered, "We must." Why? "Because we can." This signal phrase reveals how little a veteran of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee has learned about the limits of American military power.

Also revealing, the moment fib monitors reached the red zone upon hearing Hillary Clinton talk about her "very difficult decision" to enroll daughter Chelsea in the highly regarded Sidwell Friends School rather than the Washington public-school system. If that was a tortured choice, it raises questions about Hill's decision-making capacity when it comes to Iraq, health care, or American factories shutting down.

[MILITARY]

HIRED GUNS

Uncle Sam needs everyone he can get—and then some more. Over the past two years, the Army has met its recruiting goals by offering higher incentives to join, employing more recruiters, and providing waivers for disqualifying physical conditions or law violations. Despite all this, for the second month in a row, Army recruiters failed to meet their goals—off 15 percent in June. The shortfalls have many in the services worried that Iraq deployments will be extended to 18 months.

As the number of citizen soldiers diminishes, the number of private soldiers surges. In World War II, only 3-5 percent of the total American forces were contractors. Now nearly half of those in theater are not servicemen. Estimates range from 126,000 to 180,000, and their salaries dwarf military pay: a liaison officer earns \$350,000 per year—and costs taxpayers \$850,000 in overhead. Fighting the war "on the cheap"—that is, without enough soldiers and Marines—means hiring the most expensive mercenary force in history.

Our policymakers thus face a choice: break the Army with more missions, break the bank with more contractors, or break their commitment to global hegemony. ■

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One-Child Foreign Policy

Lower birth rates will alter both society and strategy.

By James Kurth

MILITARY ANALYSTS are always talking about strategy. Often they are proposing one that they have just invented and naturally think will be the solution to the nation's security problems. The present time, filled as it is with the threat of Islamist terrorism and with the debacle of the Iraq War, is especially marked by the proliferation of strategic proposals.

More seasoned analysts know, however, that if any strategy is to prove effective, it must fit social and structural realities, including the state of technology, the economy, and the political system. Less noted is the role of demography.

Until recently, demographic changes were so slow that they hardly seemed to be a variable effecting strategic challenges. But today, many major nations are undergoing rapid and evident changes in their demographic structure. This is most obvious in Europe, but it is also the case in the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. Demographic disruption is impacting America, all of its major allies, and all of its traditional or potential adversaries.

In Western countries, the combination of a sharp decline in the birth rates of the European or European-descended population, on the one hand, and the sharp increase in the non-European immigrant population, on the other, is causing a great transformation in social structure and national identity, which is bringing about a major transformation in military strategy. The process has only begun, but in the years ahead, history will teach us once again that demography is destiny.

In order for a particular population to sustain its numbers, it should have an average reproduction rate of 2.1 births per woman. But the birth rate for almost every Western nation has fallen below 1.5 during the last couple of decades. In Italy and Spain, formerly the European nations with the highest birth rates, it is now under 1.3. Although the United States has a rising population, that growth is entirely due to immigration and to the higher reproduction rates of peoples of non-European origin. With the exception of devout religious communities—especially the Mormons—among most European-American groups, reproduction rates are below the level of sustainability.

When one projects these demographic statistics forward, it appears inevitable that in half a century most European-descended peoples will have only two-thirds or less of the population that they have today. Furthermore, a much larger percentage of that population will be old and no longer able to work. It follows that national security will have a very different meaning when nations themselves have become so different.

A transformation in Western, particularly American, military strategy has occurred alongside this demographic transformation. New technologies have issued in great improvements in what the military calls C4—command, control, communication, and computers. In the past two decades, the U.S. military has found it essential to incorporate these improvements into its strategies, operations, and weapons acquisitions, with the

totality of results being called the “revolution in military affairs” or RMA.

Unfortunately, there is always someone who will carry a good thing too far, as was the case with former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's ineffective “military transformation” project. Rumsfeld's misuse of the RMA meant reducing the size of the U.S. ground forces, but it had always been focused upon enabling our military to defeat other militaries—that is to say, upon conventional war—and had nothing to say about defeating insurgencies, as has become amply clear in Iraq. Rumsfeld's reductions made the transformed ground forces even less capable of dealing with the Iraqi insurgency than the old-fashioned pre-transformation forces would have been.

There has also been a parallel “revolution in attitudes toward the military” or RAM. Whereas the RMA has principally been propelled by the new technologies of the information economy, the RAM has been driven by the new demography of low birth rates. These two revolutions are connected and mutually reinforcing.

In the modernizing societies of a century ago, the number of children per couple was normally four or more. It was also common for some of these children to die from disease while their parents were still living. If it happened that some instead died while fighting in a war, this was seen as a sad, but not surprising, variation on the familiar theme of death among the young.

Today, it is very rare for a child in post-modern society to die from disease while his parents are alive. And if he should die

in military combat, this is seen as a shocking surprise. Indeed, for one of these rare children to die in such a rare way will increasingly seem a unique catastrophe and an unacceptable scandal. This is particularly true for the children of the professional class—the liberal professionals and the professional liberals. This class, of course, is especially large and dominant in the information economy and postmodern culture.

It is difficult to imagine such a society, with its one-child demography and no-death mentality, undertaking such military operations as the massive infantry assaults and trench warfare of World War I, the immense amphibious invasions and foxhole fighting of World War II, and the prolonged and stalemated combat of the Korean War. These kinds of operations could be undertaken by a modern society, but they probably are beyond the capabilities of a postmodern one. The popular opposition to the prolonged combat of the Vietnam War and now the Iraq War illustrates the point. Rather, the military undertakings that are suitable for a postmodern society are the highly mobile and extremely brief operations of the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo War. Above all, they must be low-casualty operations. (During the Kosovo War, NATO forces did not suffer a single combat death.)

This low-casualty imperative is the major feature of the revolution in attitudes toward the military. It obviously has a major impact, and imposes major limitations, upon strategy, especially the strategy of the U.S. Army. It is also a major factor promoting the revolution in military affairs, as the United States once again, as it has in earlier wars, seeks to use high technologies to ensure low casualties. This is especially the case with the strategy of the U.S. Air Force.

In the aftermath of their dismal Iraq experience, American ground forces, especially the Army, will very likely

want to avoid counterinsurgency wars. After the Vietnam War, the Army tried to reinvent itself in a way that would make it difficult for civilian policymakers to put it into a war involving guerrillas or insurgents. The famous Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which in effect proscribed prolonged counterinsurgency wars, was one result. The Air-Land Battle Doctrine, which provided for high-tech wars against conventional armies, was another. After the Iraq War, the Army will probably turn to some new high-tech variation of its conventional definition and mission and therefore to some new version of the RMA to correct the distorted version of the Rumsfeld era. Moreover, the post-Iraq and neo-RMA Army will have to operate within the context of a widespread popular resistance to military casualties, which will be even greater than it was before the Iraq War—a sort of neo-RAM.

What strategy will the Army develop in response to the double impact of the post-Iraq versions of the RMA and the RAM? What kind of enemies will the Army want to fight so that it can use high technology to fight its wars, while keeping American casualties low?

On the one hand, it is clear that the Army will not want to fight guerrillas or insurgents, and therefore it will not really develop a counterinsurgency strategy. Most of the current Army's focus upon counterinsurgency strategy will disappear soon after it withdraws from Iraq, rather like its elaborate, if short-lived, efforts at counterinsurgency strategy made during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, it is also clear that the Army will not want to fight the conventional forces of America's most obvious peer competitor, China.

The kind of enemies that the Army will want to fight will be something in between: the conventional forces of medium or small-size powers—what have often been called rogue states. But

the Army will want to be sure that these enemies' conventional forces do not turn into counterinsurgencies, as happened in Iraq. Indeed, in the months before the Iraq War began, the Army was concerned about this very possibility. That is why the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, wanted several hundred thousand soldiers to impose order in post-Saddam Iraq and to abort an insurgency before it could develop. Still earlier, and because of the same concern, the Army had been very cautious about sending ground troops into Kosovo in 1999. (It was the good fortune of the Army—and of the Clinton administration—that Serbia capitulated before NATO ground forces had to be employed.)

Given all of these constraints, there are not really that many enemies left for the U.S. Army to fight. The Bush administration's 2002 list of rogue states—the notorious “axis of evil”—specified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. But given what has happened in Iraq, it is unlikely that the Army will want to fight in Iran; it not only looks too much like Iraq, but is three times as big. As for North Korea, the Army has long been prepared to fight a conventional, high-tech campaign against that country's conventional, low-tech army. But North Korea is now not just a conventional power; it is potentially a nuclear one. If even the Bush administration has proved reluctant to use military force against North Korea, it is almost certain that any future administration will be reluctant, too.

It thus appears that the Army is left with no specific and identifiable enemy. The most that it will be able to contemplate is some hypothetical, conventional rogue state that may materialize sometime in the future—which makes it difficult to develop a credible strategy.

The two military revolutions have very different consequences for the U.S. Air Force than for the Army. From its beginning, the Air Force has seen itself

as the most high-tech of the services, and it has always sold itself as being the most able to win victory with low casualties.

In World War II, the U.S. Air Force promised “victory through air power” and “precision bombing.” In the Cold War, it promised not only “more bang for the buck” but also less blood for the bang. Of course, the Korean War and the Vietnam War demonstrated the limitations of air power and the continuing necessity for ground forces, but the Air Force persisted in the pursuit of its long-standing mission. The Persian Gulf War of 1991, with its initial air campaign of five weeks and its subsequent ground campaign of only four days, brought it closer to that goal. The Bosnian War of 1995, with the NATO air strikes overshadowing what was actually the more decisive ground campaign conducted by the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim armies, appeared to bring it closer still. Then the Kosovo War of 1999 became the first war in history to be won by air power alone and the first war in which the victorious side did not suffer a single combat casualty. The long journey of the U.S. Air Force through the wars of the 20th century toward its goal of victory through air power by itself had at last reached its destination. Kosovo seemed to decisively demonstrate the efficacy and efficiency of a military strategy based upon air power and precision bombing.

The initial Afghan campaign, which relied heavily upon air bombardment of concentrations of Taliban forces, seemed to underline the value of the Air Force strategy. So did the initial Iraq campaign. But as soon as these conventional campaigns were superceded by counterinsurgency ones, it became clear that the Air Force’s old strategic solution had no convincing answer to the new strategic problem. In the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghan wars, the Air Force, like the Army, will have to find the right kind of enemies to fight.

The Air Force’s idea of fighting is bombing. And although bombing is largely useless against insurgents, it can be very useful against conventional militaries, particularly against armored forces—using machines to destroy machines. Although the Air Force has always resisted having its principal mission defined as ground support, or assistance to the Army, it is willing to undertake such operations on occasion.

The Air Force really likes to bomb civilian targets. But it recognizes that massive bombing as with Germany and Japan during World War II, North Korea during the Korean War, and, briefly, Hanoi during the Vietnam War is not seen as legitimate by the publics of post-modern societies. The no-death mentality seems to apply even to enemies. Consequently, the Air Force used the RMA to transform the mass bombing of civilians of the mid-20th century into the precision bombing of particular civilian installations during the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo War. This is the kind of bombing that the Air Force will want to do in the future.

With the exception of insurgents, the Air Force will seek to bomb the very enemies that the Army will seek to avoid. Whereas the Army sees the size of China and even of Iran as presenting a formidable obstacle, the Air Force sees a “target-rich environment.” Indeed, during discussions within the Pentagon about a possible U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Air Force has been willing and eager to undertake this campaign, while the Army and the Marine Corps have been opposed.

Of course, because China is a nuclear power, U.S. civilian policymakers will be extremely reluctant to launch any air bombardment of its civilian installations. And so, in the end, the Air Force may not be left with many more specific and identifiable enemies than the U.S. Army.

China, like the U.S., is also characterized by a sharp decline in its birth rate, which will affect its military strategy. China’s lowered birth rate, of course, is not a result of postmodern values—it is still a modernizing society, although one with substantial modern sectors—but of the government’s one-child policy. And like the United States, China has undertaken its own version of military transformation. It has substantially reduced the numbers of its infantry soldiers and is developing an impressive capability to use high technologies for military purposes, especially for cyberwar. China seeks to trump the U.S. advantage in capital-intensive, high-tech weapons systems, particularly aircraft carriers and fighter bombers, by leaping over these to a new, information-age version of asymmetrical warfare.

(There is one peculiar twist to China’s low birth rate. Because of the traditional preference for male children, the government’s one-child policy often becomes a one-boy, no-girl practice. Some Chinese provinces now have as many as 120 or more boys for every 100 girls. As these excess boys reach late adolescence, the age of both high youth-crime rates and high army-recruitment rates, maintaining internal stability may require the civilizing influence of military discipline, leading it to maintain a large army despite depressed birth rates.)

Russia has been afflicted with the greatest decline in birth rate of any major power in the past two decades. For this reason, but also because of economic constraints and bureaucratic corruption and incompetence, the Russian Army has become hollow. Russia has many grievances against several of its neighbors, which were once republics within the Soviet Union and are now within Russia’s “near abroad.” But its army is not a very effective instrument for the Kremlin to use in dealing with these grievances. Instead, it has turned

to non-military instruments, such as cutting off vital oil and natural gas exports or, recently, cyberwar attacks on Estonia's vital government and financial computer systems. Russia's low birth rate means that its army probably will be weak for years to come.

It might thus seem that the consequences of demographic change are rather benign, at least with respect to the prospects for greater international peace and tranquility. America's historical and potential peer competitors and military rivals are less likely to engage in aggression because they lack the large reserves of surplus manpower that were so much a part of their military pasts. And America itself will be less likely to undertake foreign wars and military adventures, not only because of the short-term consequences of its debacle in Iraq but also because of the long-term effects of its low birth rate and the low-casualty imperative. From a traditional conservative perspective, with its emphasis on the prudent, sensible, and realistic use of military force, the era of low birth rates among the major powers might seem to be a good thing.

Unfortunately, when we turn our attention from the international arena to the domestic one, and from military strategy to internal security, a very different picture emerges. Particularly in the West, radical demographic change means that the prospect for greater peace and tranquility abroad is dialectically and diabolically connected to the prospect for greater conflict and violence at home.

Current social attitudes and demographic trends in the West suggest that there will be a continuation of low reproduction rates among Western peoples and therefore a severe decline in their populations. Conversely, there will be a continuation of high immigration of non-Western peoples into the Western nations and of higher reproduction rates among the non-Western communities in the

At a National Security Council meeting in mid-July, the principals discussed the actions the U.S. should take in the event of a domestic terrorist attack this summer,

the possibility of which is highlighted in the classified version of the just published National Intelligence Estimate. The president and the vice president agreed to retaliate with military strikes. The main targets would likely be al-Qaeda training camps inside the Waziristan area of Pakistan, where the hostility of Pashtun tribes in the area, as well as the inhospitable mountainous terrain, eliminate the possibility for ground attacks. It was also decided that the intelligence would have to be specific and reliable, something that has been often lacking in the past. Unfortunately, recent intelligence about the al-Qaeda leadership has not provided real-time information on the whereabouts of Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden, and bombing strikes would probably have little or no effect on future terrorist operations unless al-Qaeda senior leadership is present and killed. Also, strikes that are conducted without Pakistani collaboration would have a negative effect on President Pervez Musharraf, whose political control is weakening. The NSC principals also discussed a strike against Iran in the event of a terrorist operation in the United States. Cheney was the primary voice arguing for such a retaliatory strike, a proposal not supported by the Department of State and the Department of Defense. President Bush reserved judgment.



Many Americans would be surprised to learn that, thanks to Congress, Israeli companies are allowed to bid on extremely sensitive defense department and intelligence agency projects

even though it is no secret in Washington that Israel continues to spy very aggressively against the United States. In 2001, the FBI strongly suspected that two Israeli telecommunications companies, AMDOCS and Comverse Infosystems, had penetrated secure telecommunications systems operated by the Pentagon, DEA, and the White House. In 2005, an Israeli company called Foxcom Wireless installed an antenna system in congressional office buildings that would have permitted monitoring of cellphone calls made by congressmen. On July 17, yet another Israeli company, computer-security provider Check Point, was named an official supplier for the Department of Defense and other federal agencies. Check Point, founded in 1993 by Gil Schwed, Shlomo Kramer, and Marius Nacht, will provide software to protect "sensitive, unclassified data residing on government laptops." Check Point has offices in California and Texas, but its main development centers are in Israel and Belarus. In March 2006, Check Point was blocked from purchasing Sourcefire, a Maryland-based company that produces intrusion-detection software used on many military and intelligence computers because it would have been an "irrevocable technology transfer to a foreign party." This time around, there was apparently no objection to the contract on security grounds in spite of the fact that software that protects a system can also have spyware or a so-called backdoor feature that could permit a third party to enter and retrieve protected information.

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West than among the Western peoples themselves. This will have major consequences not only for the military strategies of the Western nations but for their national security—and even identity.

The most dramatic consequences are likely to occur in Europe, where most of the non-Western populations will be Muslim. These communities already perform functions essential to the economic system, and within the next decade, they are poised to become an important part of the political system. Many European countries will become two nations, and Europe as a whole will become two civilizations. The first will be a Western civilization or, more accurately, given Europeans' rejection of many Western traditions, a post-Western civilization comprised of people of European descent. It will be secular, even pagan, rich, old, and feeble. The second will be the non-Western civilization, descended from non-European peoples. It will be religious, even Islamic, poor, young, and vigorous. It will be a kind of overseas colony of a foreign civilization, a familiar occurrence in European history, but this time the foreign civilization will be the *umma* of Islam and the colonized country will be Europe itself. The two civilizations will regard each other with mutual contempt. In the new civilization, there will be a growing rage, and in the old civilization, there will be a growing fear. These will be the perfect conditions for endemic Islamic terrorism, urban riots, and mob violence: an Islamist insurgency within Europe itself.

Analogous, but less dramatic, developments are likely to occur in the United States. Here the most numerous of the non-Western communities will be Latin American in their origin. Latino immigrants already perform functions essential to the American economic system and are steadily acquiring political power, including a kind of veto on

many issues. It is possible that the United States might also become two nations or even two civilizations, although this is not as likely as in Europe. It is probably too much to predict that in the Anglo nation there will be a widespread fear of some kind of Latino terrorism, although young Latinos in the United States may learn from their Islamic counterparts in Europe. It is quite plausible, however, that there will be Latino urban riots and mob violence. And it is very likely that there will be a widespread fear of Latino crime. Gated communities, which are already widespread in the southwestern United States, could become an even more central part of the Anglo way of life, the distinctive architectural style and urban design of the Anglo nation.

Is there any kind of strategy that can deal effectively with the kind of internal violence and insecurity that many Western nations will face in the future?

On the one hand, this challenge is obviously not one of traditional war against a foreign military, so conventional military strategies will not be applicable. Neither is it defined by sporadic attacks by small, separated terrorist groups, so standard counterterrorist strategies are also inapplicable. What we face instead are episodic and perhaps endemic terrorist attacks and violence perpetrated by a minority supported by a much larger community hostile toward the majority society. Such a condition is normally called insurgency or, if it reaches a large enough scale, civil war.

European nations could experience in their homelands and from a Muslim minority of 10 percent or more a version of what France experienced in its Algerian colony from a Muslim majority of 90 percent. And the European population will have no place to retreat to. The Basque guerrillas in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Muslim

insurgents in India (Kashmir) are largely concentrated in a particular territory, making territorial secession seem like a viable objective. That is not the case with the Muslim community within Europe.

In the past, a minority community that turned militant has almost always been confronted with a majority that also became militant. In short, the majority had enough sense of being a community that it could come together, bring its weight to bear, and put down the militant minority. Effective and appropriate tactics have included arresting and imprisoning some of the minority's leaders and co-opting or isolating the rest, and, if there has been another minority community, setting it against the militant one. And from time to time, violent young men of the majority have engaged in their own mob violence against the minority. This has wonderfully concentrated the mind of the minority community and usually resulted in its becoming more prudent. Of course, in our era of low birth rates, there are not that many young men of the majority around.

When a militant, violent minority community confronts a militant, violent majority community, the outcome will be clear—so clear that the minority is usually sensible enough not to become militant and violent in the first place. The outcome is less certain when a minority community confronts a majority that is only one in the numerical sense—just a conglomeration of little groups and isolated individuals who define themselves by ideologies like multiculturalism, diversity, or expressive individualism.

For the nations of the West, which have arrived at this historically unprecedented state, a viable strategy for the nation is no longer really possible because they are no longer really nations at all. ■

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The Chips Are Down

With our computers frozen, would the U.S. still be a superpower?
China intends to find out.

By Claude Salhani

IN THIS GALAXY, in the not too distant future...

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded that the U.S. military focus its attention—and much of its research and development—on how best to respond to low-tech threats such as primitive improvised explosive devices. While the IEDs proved to be deadly for the troops of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq—the majority of casualties suffered were from exploding roadside bombs—the long-term effect they had on the American military was far more consequential. The real impact was felt only a few years later when the United States became involved in its next major conflict—with China.

The two wars in the Middle East were, from a scientific perspective, low-tech engagements in which conventional military forces fought urban guerrillas. Following a sweeping victory that brought the U.S. military from the Kuwaiti border right up to Baghdad and beyond in record time, the administration believed that victory had been attained and prematurely declared the end of major combat operations. As we were to find out, this was far from the case. American soldiers and Marines—and the 60,000-odd contract workers supporting the U.S. military—soon had to grapple with a new problem: roadside bombs detonated by remote control. Lethal as they were, these homemade gadgets were rudimentary. They were relatively easy to assemble, hide, trans-

port, place along the roads where coalition troops were bound to pass by, and detonate remotely. At one point, U.S. soldiers found that a simple remote control sold with \$50 battery-operated toy cars at Radio Shack allowed American troops to preempt the IEDs by detonating the insurgents' bombs ahead of American convoys.

As the casualty toll from the IEDs began to grow, the military focused on countermeasures. Resources from the military's own research groups and defense contractors across the country became absorbed by the problem. As could be expected, the resistance and the *jihadi* fighters answered by creating more sophisticated bombs, for example, building the casing out of plastic to avoid detection by mine sweepers. This only prompted the military to keep looking for ways to thwart newer generations of IEDs. And the deadly cycle continued until the end of the war in October 2017—or at least the end of the war for the United States.

American engagement in Iraq officially ended when a detachment of Navy SEALs—the last group of U.S. Special Forces—were extracted out of Anbar Province in the middle of the night. Al-Qaeda fighters, having learned from an informer of the U.S. evacuation plan, attempted to ambush them. They began firing on the 16 SEALs—divided into two teams of eight—as they hooked harnesses onto cables attached to the underbellies of two large CH-47 Sea

Knight Marine helicopters. The gunmen missed the SEALs for the most part. Three Marine Cobra attack helicopters providing cover fire quickly silenced the attackers.

Between the time the first American soldier set foot on Iraqi soil in 2003 and the last of the Navy SEALs commandos left the country in 2017, and while the U.S. military remained preoccupied in countering threats emanating from low-tech devices in an asymmetrical war, halfway around the globe the Chinese did not remain idle. Aware that the day would come when the People's Liberation Army might have to face the American Army in battle, China began looking toward the place that conflict might be conducted. Their conclusion: the one who controlled space was guaranteed victory.

The Chinese leadership was fully aware that the PLA could never stand up to the U.S. military in a conventional war, despite China's superior number of troops—one million under arms. The U.S. war machine is made up of the most fantastic pieces of armament ever incorporated into any fighting force in the history of man.

From the main battle tank, the Abrams M1A1, to Cobra attack helicopters, to Marine vertical take-off and landing Harrier jump jets, to the U.S. Air Force's crown jewel, the B1 stealth bomber, to the magnificent armadas that the U.S. Navy can deploy with its nuclear powered aircraft carriers, attack

submarines, and destroyers anywhere on the face of the globe, the Chinese military leadership had reason to worry.

Its war planners projected that the day would come when they would have to face America's military in a standoff, most likely over the island of Taiwan, seen by China as a breakaway province and considered by the United States to be a friend and ally. They began to plan accordingly.

While the U.S. military was occupied developing simple solutions to counter low-tech threats in the Middle East, Beijing quietly went about developing high-tech systems to place aboard dozens of "communication" satellites that were developed, tested, and launched into space. Today, the Chinese have 56 satellites in space.

On Jan. 11, 2007, a missile was launched from the Chinese mainland to an altitude of 537 miles, slamming straight into its target—an obsolete Chinese weather satellite. The target was instantly destroyed, reportedly producing almost 900 trackable pieces of space debris. At that time, the U.S. military was far too preoccupied with what was happening in Iraq to worry about Chinese missiles. It proved to be an oversight—a major one.

China made good use of this oblivion. Along with its space-launched missile defense initiative, the Chinese busied themselves with finding ways to immobilize America's far superior tanks, warplanes, and battleships and render the U.S. military's computers and their communication and command-and-control systems useless. The Chinese knew that time was limited and that once the U.S. began to disengage from Iraq and Afghanistan, its military would regroup and reassess new threats and move to counter them.

The conflict began pretty much like most conflicts do: gradual escalation and exchanges of strongly worded commu-

niqués, culminating with threats, followed by military action.

Beijing announced that if the newly elected government in Taiwan declared independence, China would intervene militarily. The United States responded by dispatching two carrier task forces attached to the *USS Abraham Lincoln* and the *USS Ronald Reagan*. Besides the usual high-tech armament, including ship-to-shore missiles, ship-to-air missiles, and ship-to-ship missiles, and 400-odd warplanes aboard the carriers, the combined task force also included two Battalion Landing Teams, some 4,000 Marines.

The Chinese had nowhere near as many warships, planes, or tanks, but they had 350,000 men aboard transport ships—and they had a secret weapon in orbit.

As the Chinese expeditionary force approached Taiwan, they crossed an imaginary red line drawn across a Pentagon map, breaching the point American generals estimated would be one from which the Chinese would not turn back.

From his command post aboard the *USS Ronald Reagan*, Adm. Anthony S. Samuelson picked up a secure telephone connecting him directly to the Pentagon and to the office of the secretary of defense. The secretary picked up on the first ring.

"Tell me it's good news, admiral."

"Wish I could, sir. They are now in firing range and are not about to turn around. It looks like this is it."

The secretary of defense asked the admiral to stand by. He picked up a burghundy phone on his desk.

The president answered instantly. "Madame President," said the secretary, "You must order the attack. If we are to proceed, it must be now."

The president scanned the room, moving her eyes around the Oval Office where her national security advisers were gathered. Each in turn nodded his

head, indicating a silent "yes." The president of the United States put the phone to her ear and told her secretary of defense to proceed. With a heavy heart, Chelsea Clinton placed the receiver back in its cradle.

As the first Chinese soldier set foot on the beaches of Taiwan, the order was received from Adm. Samuelson's headquarters to open fire.

Minutes before the order was given, some 300 miles up in space, a Chinese scientific satellite released a burst of electro-magnetic energy aimed at American and Taiwanese forces. Other similar satellites positioned strategically around the Earth released a number of similar bursts directed at strategic U.S. missile silos in the continental United States, Korea, and Australia.

Total confusion followed. Not one order issued electronically by U.S. command-and-control centers reached its target. Missiles fired from the ships of the Seventh Fleet went straight into space and exploded harmlessly above the earth. The Abrams M1A1 tanks started to turn around in circles like demented prehistoric dogs trying to bite their tails. The few planes that managed to take off from the carriers crashed into the South China Sea. Search-and-rescue helicopters were unable to even start their engines.

The Chinese were able to walk ashore and take Taiwan without firing a single shot.

Thankfully, the battle for Taiwan unfolded only in this author's imagination. But the scenario is not entirely outside the realm of possibility. It is time to finish the war in Iraq and hand the Iraqis responsibility for their land and their own future. It is also time to look ahead. Our competitors are. ■

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Can We Win the Ideological War?

Asked during World War II why the British continued to fight so ferociously, Churchill is said to have snorted, "If we stop, you'll find out."

The question arises in the war on terror: we know who the main enemy is, al-Qaeda, the men and movement responsible for 9/11, but what are they fighting for? What is their war all about?

A year ago, in Salt Lake City, President Bush, addressing the American Legion, sought to define the war from his perspective: "The war we fight today is more than a military conflict; it is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century. On one side are those who believe in the values of freedom and moderation—the right of all people to speak, and worship, and live in liberty. And on the other side are those driven by the values of tyranny and extremism—the right of a self-appointed few to impose their fanatical views on all the rest."

Certainly terrorists who massacre innocents are fanatics. Certainly, the caliphate bin Laden's acolytes would establish would be tyrannical. But if the enemy were only a cabal of terrorists, hell-bent on establishing a tyranny, they would not be on the verge of expelling us from Iraq and perhaps from Afghanistan.

Why are we losing the war if President Bush has correctly defined the stakes in this "ideological struggle"?

One reason is that the true goals of bin Laden, the insurgents in Iraq, and the Taliban are not so abstract as those of Mr. Bush. They are concrete, understandable, realizable, and appealing to millions.

In his declaration of war on the United States, bin Laden listed three goals: expel U.S. forces from the sacred

soil of Saudi Arabia, stop the persecution of innocent Iraqis through U.S.-UN sanctions, and end the Israeli repression and dispossession of the Palestinian people.

Not only do these goals have broad appeal to Arab peoples, bin Laden has achieved victory in the first. After 9/11, U.S. forces were pulled out of Saudi Arabia at the request of the king.

And while Bush calls this an ideological struggle, the enemy has allied itself with some very powerful ideas. As did Mao and Ho Chi Minh, our enemy has captured the flag of nationalism: We fight to get your troops off our land! We fight to get your hooks out of our government! Leave us to rule ourselves!

More importantly, our enemy has rooted his cause in a 1,400-year-old religion that has 1.2 billion adherents, has survived crusades, invasions and occupations, and is growing again in militancy and converts

Our enemy, be it Shia or Sunni in Iraq or the Taliban in Afghanistan, claims to be fighting for a rule of law, Sharia, sanctioned by the Koran, and a form of government the Prophet mandates for Islamic peoples. And that is not some secular-liberal, do-your-own-thing democracy.

As for the tactics the enemy uses, decent Muslims the world over are said to be growing disgusted with the slaughter by suicide bombers of men, women, and children.

But are these not the tactics the French maquis and Italian and Yugoslav partisans used on the Nazis and their

collaborators? Was this not the way Israelis expelled the British, the Algerians expelled the French, the Afghans expelled the Soviets, the ANC overthrew apartheid, and Hezbollah drove the IDF out of Lebanon?

Clausewitz would understand: terrorism is the extension of Islamist politics by other means.

If we know what al-Qaeda is fighting for, what exactly are we fighting for? Taking the president literally, we are fighting for the right of Islamic peoples "to speak, and worship, and live in liberty."

Here we come to our dilemma. Devout Muslims in Islamic lands do not believe people should be free to blaspheme or insult the Prophet. They do not believe all religions are equal or should be treated equally. They do not believe Christians should be free to preach in their lands. The punishment for those who do, and for those who convert from Islam in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia as well as Iran, is death.

Moreover, in every Middle East country, Islamic parties have broadening support. In free elections in Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Iran, Islamists made gains or racked up victories. In Turkey, a moderate Islamic party just won national power.

It is Western secularism that is in retreat. It is our friends in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, the Gulf states, and Israel who seem most apprehensive about any more elections among the Arab masses. The Islamists seem to welcome them—and to succeed in them.

Should U.S. soldiers die for democracy in the Islamic world, when democracy may produce victory for the political progeny of the Muslim Brotherhood? Is that worth the lives of America's young? ■

What Hillary Hides

Passionate yet distant, pious yet deceptive, the former first lady is the most provocative of the 2008 presidential candidates—and perhaps the least known.

By Nicholas von Hoffman

IN HIS BIOGRAPHY of Hillary Clinton, Carl Bernstein writes of when Alan Simpson, a Republican senator from Wyoming and a man of great repute, paid a visit to Bill Clinton in the White House at the beginning of the president's second term. Simpson is quoted as telling Clinton, "Now that I am leaving office I can tell you something. You are going to suffer immeasurable difficulty, and this is payback [by Republicans] for Watergate. So expect the worst."

The Clintons and many another Democrat may believe that they got the worst and that Hillary is the ideal person to repay the Republicans in kind. Or it may be that Republicans, their anger over the 2006 midterm rout unslaked, will attempt to pay her back again if their night fears are realized and the Clintons come to power a second time.

With Hillary as the front-running Democratic candidate, the 2008 election is shaping up to have something of Buenos Aires about it. The adoration and hatred she inspires has a tincture of the nearly immortal Evita.

Whether Hillary gets to be the central figure in a musical or an actual opera, as with *Nixon in China*, it is a sure bet that before she trundles off into history, the lady will be the heroine or villain in more than one made-for-TV movie. You have to go back to the 1820s and Rachel Jackson to find a presidential wife as reviled as Hillary, since Eleanor Roosevelt's detractors did not call her a whore. If Hillary is elected, she will

enter office in a vortex of passions, pro and con, at least vaguely comparable to those that followed Abraham Lincoln into the White House. The fear was that he would be assassinated before he could take the oath, and while Hillary does not, let's hope, trigger such violent feelings, the woman gets to people. Polling suggests 80 percent of the country either loves or hates her—and she drives the people who hate her nuts.

Though they are more than competently done, neither *A Woman In Charge*, Bernstein's biography, nor another new one, *Her Way*, by Jeff Gerth and Don Van Natta, has the emotional force to convey a sense of this woman. Hillary fell so hopelessly in love—against her will it seems—that she gave up a promising legal career and calling to help the nation's most distressed children to follow an invincibly charming man with unlikely ideas about how to get ahead in the world to a backwater state known—if known at all—for being the butt of trailer-trash jokes. Now she stands a fair chance of being elected president of the United States.

None of our authors can get their arms around this love story. Gerth and Van Natta do not try. They are seasoned *New York Times* reporters who have been on the Hillary story for years. They provide the hard politics and leave aside matters of heart. But Bernstein takes a pass at this romance. *New York Times* book reviewer Jennifer Senior noted a parallel between Bill and his wife's biographer.

Bernstein was at one point married to writer Nora Ephron, who made the author, already famous, doubly so as the womanizing husband in a 1986 roman à clef called *Heartburn*. Senior observes that "his book suggests that it isn't his executive-scandal bona fides that make him a qualified Hillary biographer; it's his bona fides as a lousy husband. Like Bill Clinton, Bernstein carried on a very public affair while married to a formidable, high-profile woman ... and one of the perverse strengths of his book is his intuitive understanding—a sinner's lament, really—of what happens to a proud woman when she's intimately betrayed and publicly humiliated."

The public betrayal of a proud woman is a theme that many have picked up on, but that cannot be the center of the story. The center must be that Hillary and Bill loved each other then and still do. They did not get divorced. He was not one of those husbands who is thrown out of the house because of his adulteries and goes on to settle down with wife number two or three or four. This a love story in which one lover injures the other, sometimes terribly, and is forgiven. They make up, they go on, one falls again, they split, they make up again. It's the kind of affair that makes friends shake their heads and say they do not understand how she continues in such a hurtful, humiliating, destructive relationship. The friends are not around for the ecstatic hours of love, union, and companionship.

From John and Abigail Adams through Woodrow and Edith Wilson to Bess and Harry Truman, there have been other White House couples who deeply loved each other. The Clintons, though, are the first with a publicly tumultuous marriage. The Hardings and the Kennedys kept their difficulties out of the papers, but they lacked the passionate closeness that is as conspicuous with this couple as Bill's infidelities. That Hillary also served as a kind of deputy president makes the tangle of their lives and our government the more fascinating and complicated.

In Bill and Hillary, we have a white-collar, Americanized version of *Tristan und Isolde* in which, instead of killing herself, Isolde runs for president—a fate worse than death for most people. The tipping point in this drama was the moment when Billary had to decide whether or not to pay off Paula Jones to prevent her lawsuit from coming to court. If they had done so, the name Lewinsky would be unknown, Ken Starr would not have gotten hold of the stained dress, there would have been no perjury and no impeachment.

Bill and his lawyers, according to Gerth and Van Natta, wanted to settle, “But Hillary ultimately overruled them, saying that, ‘the public would see a settlement as confirmation,’ declaring that if they paid Jones a single dollar, ‘the lawsuits would never end.’ Hillary seemed to be suggesting that there were other women out there who would be encouraged to file a law suit against her husband ... but ... her advice turned out to be disastrous.” The heroine, in the course of trying to save her lover, destroys him—and herself.

How unsuited Hillary would seem to be for such a role. She is described as a private person, who keeps her feelings to herself. Religiously, she is a pious Methodist, a denomination not known for raucous displays. Yet she is hooked

up to a shouting Baptist given to showing emotion and feeling to the broadest possible public.

What may be needed with this topic is a double biography. It may not be possible to write a truly satisfying one of either Hillary or Bill separately. After 32 years of marriage, during which they worked together so closely, they cannot be said to have had stand-alone careers.

According to Gerth and Van Natta, Hillary and Bill exchanged promises for a joint career almost at the outset of their relationship: “More than three decades ago, in the earliest days of their romance, Bill and Hillary struck a plan, one that would become both the foundation and the engine of their relationship. They agreed to work together to revolutionize the Democratic Party and ultimately make the White House their home. ... with Bill's victory in

had always had a tendency to look at people and events with almost biblical judgement. She often weighed matters in terms of good and evil.” After the death of Vince Foster, she “found more to judge as evil,” Atkinson adds. “There seemed to be something basic reinforcing her view of good and evil, an element of embitterment there, and the notion of conspiracy. There was no reason to have that so early in her life but it existed.” According to Atkinson, Clinton was driven by a “dangerous attitude—not just with Republicans and enemies, but even toward people like [George] Stephanopoulos: ‘Are you with us or are you against us?’ And that led to more demonizing, more judgement of evil around her. It seemed more potent because of self-justification fueled by these Old Testament judgements of good and evil.”

IN BILL AND HILLARY, WE HAVE A **WHITE-COLLAR, AMERICANIZED VERSION OF TRISTAN UND ISOLDE** IN WHICH, INSTEAD OF **KILLING HERSELF**, ISOLDE RUNS FOR PRESIDENT—**A FATE WORSE THAN DEATH FOR MOST PEOPLE**.

1992, their plan became even more ambitious: eight years as president for him, then eight years for her. Their audacious pact has remained a secret until now.”

That pact makes the connection between the two look less like romantic love than power lust. If that is the way it is, out goes Wagner and the *Liebestod* and in comes the Macbeth family. But perhaps they are not mutually exclusive. As Bill says, “Buy one, get two.”

This time around, purchasers are getting Hillary first. In the pages of both these books, she can be fierce, and unlike her husband, she is a grudge keeper, not someone who forgets. Bernstein quotes an old Clinton friend, architect Dick Atkinson, who claims “Hillary

Neither book much speculates about what kind of a president she would be, but Hillaryland smacks enough of the present White House to cause a twinge or two. Writing last year in *The New Republic*, Ryan Lizza offered this description of the place:

Ever since 1992, when a young campaign staffer answered a phone call from Hillary with the greeting ‘Hillaryland,’ the future first lady and her devoted, mostly female aides have embraced the cutesy sobriquet as a way to describe their unique, un-Bill (and sometimes anti-Bill) sorority. ... In the Clinton White House, Hillaryland grew into an influential but

often frustrated power center inhabited by dutiful staffers whose first allegiance was to the first lady, not the president. '[W]e were also our little subculture within the White House,' Hillary writes in her memoir. 'My staff prided themselves on discretion, loyalty and camaraderie, and we had our own special ethos. While the West Wing had a tendency to leak, Hillaryland never did. While the president's senior advisers jockeyed for big offices and proximity to the Oval Office, my senior staff happily shared offices with their young assistants.' Bill Clinton staffers regarded the dwellers in Hillaryland as Kool-Aid drinkers with awful political judgment. Hillarylanders saw Bill's people as showboats and referred to them dismissively as the 'white boys.'

The woman has a guarded personality and an inability to show a relaxed, approachable public self. Add to those characteristics Hillaryland and a history of operating in secret, and you have a recipe for trouble. Her 1993 attempts to shroud her health program from the prying eyes of the public is close enough to Dick Cheney's closed-doors, eyes-only performance with his energy program to furrow a brow. You cannot read these two books without wondering if she, too, will curtain off the government.

Also to be taken into account is Hillary and truth telling—or the want thereof. Both biographies are heavy with instances of fibbing, white lying, misdirecting, and taking liberties with fact. It is impossible to imagine any politician at her level going through a career as long as hers without doing some serious dissembling, but what is troublesome is how often she's been caught.

Both books point to the time she got on the Diane Rehm radio show and said, anent providing the *Washington Post* with all the Whitewater documents, "We actually did that with the *New York Times*. We took every document we had, which again I have to say were not many. We laid them all out." The statement was not only untrue but easily discredited.

Good politicians lie as seldom as they can so that when they do, people believe them. Hillary's failure to carry off her various prevarications makes one wonder about her political skills. Bernstein quotes a member of her legal team remarking that her "instincts are horrible in terms of politics, in terms of managing a crisis like this, like the one she was in, like the one [Bill] got in with Monica. ... We had a joke that all we had to do was ask her, What would you do? And then do just the opposite, without even thinking about it ... because almost always her instincts were wrong, backwards. ... And she never surrounded herself with people who would stand up to her, who where of a different mind."

Gerth, Van Natta, and Bernstein give Hillary's senatorial career a lick and a promise. The absence of a closer account is a serious flaw. These years are free of the *Sturm und Drang* of the previous 25, and are less fun to write about, but they are the best indicator of whether she has overcome the angry, secretive, and stubborn behavior that has caused her past political injury. We are told that the Hillary of the sharp elbow has given way to a legislator with a reputation for working well with others. This Hillary is a dealmaker, the antithesis of the obdurate woman whose intransigence ensured the defeat of her health plan.

Bernstein mentions her success at getting on the Senate Armed Services Committee to reassure voters that a candidate previously identified with chil-

dren, women, and health issues is capable of being commander in chief. A fire-breathing war supporter who voted for the Patriot Act, Hillary may be a case of overcompensation. Democratic politicians are prone to go overboard at proving how tough they are. Hillary, in addition to bearing that fardel, may believe that the supposed weakness of her gender demands that she put on a horned helmet, grab a spear, and do a Valkyrie number for the war jingos.

There is no way of guessing. Nor can we discern the role her husband might play in her administration. Will she stick to NAFTA and the globalist free-trade policies that hallmarked Bill's years in office? Will she place as much emphasis on a balanced budget as the first Clinton did? Nobody can say, and she isn't talking.

In the days of their youth, both she and Barack Obama were influenced by Saul Alinsky, the from-the-people-up organizer for whom I once worked, who called himself a radical, although he was closer to John Locke than Karl Marx. Obama's speeches make clear that he still very much believes in the participatory democracy Alinsky preached, but if Hillary does, it is not reflected in her rhetoric. Will it pop back up once she is sworn in?

Whatever the answers, the Clinton machine is rolling. It is hyperorganized, peopled with skillful political veterans, endowed with lavish funding, endorsed by stars of stage, screen, and sports, and led by a well-spoken, sharp leader who has learned her craft at every level. On paper she is formidable, but elections are won and lost in voting booths. ■

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Musharraf on the Edge

Almost six years ago, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf swore that he would begin combating radicalism and working to reform the religious schools that

churn out Islamic militants. Last month in Islamabad, the Pakistani army's battle with militants in the Red Mosque showed just how meaningless this vow has been. Musharraf's lethal combination of blundering and impotence has reaped a bitter harvest that threatens to worsen Pakistan's internal instability and enhance the power of resurgent pro-Taliban tribal forces in Waziristan.

Militants coming from the *madrasah* system that Musharraf has been unable or unwilling to reform holed up in the Lal Masjid, Islamabad's Red Mosque, which had served as their base and weapons cache. By the start of July, the mosque had become the refuge for Islamic vigilantes whose activities in the mosque's environs included the abduction of Chinese nationals, which turned this local lawlessness into a high priority for a government eager to satisfy its Chinese patron. After a week-long siege, the Pakistani military stormed the mosque on July 10. Some 100 people died, including a dozen soldiers.

This latest episode in a string of challenges to Musharraf's authority and Islamabad's central rule highlights the dangerous weaknesses of the Pakistani state. It serves as a reminder of Musharraf's increasingly tenuous grip on power and the potential for a radical Islamic insurrection that would be ruinous for American efforts in neighboring Afghanistan. Finally, it reveals the risks of American reliance on the unsteady hand of a military ruler who has lost the confidence of his country's

population and warns us of the politically explosive nature of U.S.-backed policies abroad.

Many of the militants hailed from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, a redoubt of tribal law effectively beyond the reach of the Musharraf government. In the wake of the mosque battle, attacks on army units and installations in the NWFP and Waziristan have risen sharply, resulting in over 100 more fatalities.

In some respects, the fight in Islamabad was simply a resumption of the unsuccessful 2006 campaign that the Pakistani army carried out in the NWFP, at American insistence. It concluded with the army's withdrawal and a negotiated settlement in which tribal elders agreed to prevent the movement of Taliban supporters into Afghanistan. Militants in Waziristan have now repudiated the settlement, and on July 17, suicide attacks reached Islamabad itself.

Following the battle, Musharraf declared his intention to stand for reelection in the fall as a military officer, citing security threats as justification for his decision not to govern as a civilian. Opposition parties are crying foul, arguing that the parliamentary election next year will be rigged to achieve the desired majority for the ruling Pakistan Muslim League.

Even before this, Pakistani political life had been stumbling from one crisis to the next. Musharraf's blatant interference with the judiciary in the removal of the chief justice of the Supreme Court prompted mass protests by prosecutors

and parliamentarians alike. And political opposition in the parliament had already become fierce and vocal after the military's ham-fisted handling of dissent in the restive province of Baluchistan. Facing an already incendiary situation fueled by Baluchi resentments and desire for regional autonomy, the army provoked mass riots when they assassinated a prominent tribal elder and Baluchi "nationalist" who had succeeded in keeping the general peace. Rather than suppressing unrest, Musharraf's clumsy tactics routinely exacerbate Pakistan's already severe problems.

Even now, Musharraf continues to exploit the real threat of Islamic militancy to justify his actions both to Washington and to Pakistanis, but as the last five years have shown, the promises of the "moderate" military man are rarely fulfilled. The United States' Pakistan policy, which has involved elevating it to the status of major non-NATO ally (shared by such countries as Australia and Japan) and looking the other way on its proliferation and terrorism abuses, has combined with Pakistan's own counterproductive policies to undermine the security interests of both countries.

Musharraf's tenure does not justify the continued lavishing of American favors. At the very least, Washington needs to stop reinforcing the general's worst instincts. He has placed a higher priority on making ideologically palatable statements ("enlightened moderation" good, extremism bad) and appearing strong through the application of brute force than on engaging in anything like a smart counterinsurgency and political strategy.

What has failed in Iraq will not fare any better in Waziristan. ■

Zealous for Zion

John Hagee assembles the Amen Corner's Amen Corner.

By Michael Brendan Dougherty

MEMBERS OF THE Cornerstone Church Orchestra wet their lips for rehearsal, preparing to blow into their shofars, those curved horns used to mark Jewish feasts. In anticipation of the evening's event, organizers arrange thousands of chairs, placing programs on each seat and covering them with flags—American or Israeli, alternating and sharply aligned. Tonight, Christians United for Israel will hold a celebration to supercharge thousands of Christian Zionists as they prepare to meet their senators and congressmen the next day on Capitol Hill.

In February 2006, televangelist John Hagee founded CUFI to “respond instantly to Washington with our concerns about Israel,” telling reporters to “think of CUFI as a Christian version of AIPAC [American Israel Public Affairs Committee].” In just over a year, Hagee, with help from charismatic pastors, is turning CUFI into the largest grassroots Christian political organization in the country. The second annual summit in Washington grew from just over 3,000 attendees last year to 4,500 this July.

CUFI brings together a stunning variety of Christians. While many of the female attendees wear modest skirts that cover even their ankles, others, sporting stiletto heels and form-fitting pants, could have stepped from the pages of *Vogue*. Not all believe in an imminent rapture, though many do. Some are Baptist, some Assemblies of God, others traveled from nondenominational churches. But they agree that the Bible commands them to “pray for the peace of Jerusalem” (Psalm 122:6),

to “speak out for Zion’s sake” (Isaiah 62:1), to “be watchmen on the walls of Jerusalem” (Isaiah 62:6), and to “bless the Jewish people” (Genesis 12:3). “When 50 million American evangelicals unite with 5 million American Jews,” Hagee says, “you know it is a match made in heaven.”

The political goals of CUFI are, in some cases, quite modest. One presentation focused on encouraging states to divest their pension funds from corporations that do business with Iran. Others are more sweeping: the U.S. must cease pressuring Israel to give up land for peace and must encourage Israel never to divide Jerusalem.

The lure of a sympathetic crowd and the chance to trade pieties with the most popular televangelists in the nation attracted Sen. Joe Lieberman and ex-senator Rick Santorum. Each preached to the converted: Islamic-fascism is the most dangerous threat facing the United States, and Israel is the “frontline.” Even John McCain took time from his ailing presidential campaign to make an unscheduled appearance. Speaking of Iraq, the senator said, “The temptation is to wash our hands of a messy situation. To follow this impulse, however, portends catastrophe, for Iraq, Israel, and the United States.”

Hagee’s charisma extends beyond his 18,000-member Texas megachurch through the 160 television stations that carry his program into 99 million households. A scholarship football player in his youth, at 67, Hagee still retains a lineman’s girth and a coach’s booming

voice. He counts Jews as well as evangelical Christians, the old and young, the well-connected and naïve among his devotees.

In the lobby of the Waldman Park Hotel, Harry Stern, a Holocaust survivor who emigrated from Czechoslovakia, heaped praise on Hagee, saying he watches his sermon every week.

Another fan, former Israeli Ambassador to the UN Dore Gold, gave two speeches at the conference. When asked what benefit it was to Israel to build support in the greenest of the grassroots Christian community, he replied, “Look at what the Saudis are doing: expensive P.R. firms in the United States, calling for re-dividing Jerusalem. ... I’m just giving a few speeches here.”

At a breakout session dedicated to youth, Dr. Robert Stearns invites college students on a trip called “The Israel Experience.” A video shows other students exhorting the audience to undertake this transformative journey. One participant, Elizabeth Wong, says with a disarming smile, “I feel like my destiny has been tied with Israel.” The presentation is followed up by a talk by Jeff Mendelson of AIPAC. “What happens to Israel will happen here,” he says somberly. As the students begin to file out to prepare for the night’s celebration, they are asked to volunteer to start pro-Israel groups on their own campuses. One from Missouri State responds to a question about the Palestinian Christians curtly: “They should go to Israel, and be all good.” Wong jumps in to correct any misunderstanding:

"The so-called Palestinians, Arab Christians ... whatever you want to call them, deserve our sympathy, too."

James Tabor of Middleboro, Kentucky wears a Star of David tie, bright blue jacket and white pants. Despite his lack of formal education, he is proficient in the current events of the Middle East. But for all his ability to pronounce the name "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad," he "still would like to see him wiped off that map." Tabor, along with his 11-year-old daughter, Ashley, carries a hand-drawn sign with American and Israeli flags and the words, "Press on for Jesus."

The image of thousands of conservative Christians from the heartland waving the flags of a foreign nation would have astounded anyone 50 years ago—except maybe George Orwell. In an essay on nationalism, he criticized G.K. Chesterton, the English writer, for romanticizing Latin countries, particularly France, on account of his Catholicism. Orwell called this "transferred nationalism" and argued that fixing upon another country allows one "to be much more nationalistic—more vulgar, more silly, more malignant, more dishonest—that he could ever be on behalf of his native country, or any unit of which he had real knowledge." But Chesterton's affinity for France was sentimental—and harmless. CUFI knits theology and politics to powerful effect: Christian Zionists support Israel because God commands them to do so.

Not every evangelical is pleased with Hagee or his conference. Pastor Chuck Carlson flew in from Scottsdale, Arizona to greet CUFI with giant yellow signs reading "Reject Apostate Christianity" and "Choose Life, Not War." "We think up to 100 million people are influenced by the ideas of John Hagee," he says. "We're becoming a culture of war." Carlson's literature is theologically conservative, attacking Hagee's gospel as "unbiblical." He smiles as each bus pulls up,

waving as if inviting visitors into his own home. "The way we're going to work with the church for peace," he says, "is to stand out in front of church and confront them." The protest attracts plenty of attention and a few heated arguments, but no converts.

Inside the convention center, nearly every major star preacher from the Trinity Broadcast Network was present. Jesse Duplantis, Kenneth and Gloria Copeland, Rod Parsley. Waiting with a somewhat bored expression on his face is Newt Gingrich.

Hagee's address covers Biblical reasons to support the state of Israel. While some have criticized him and many of the other televangelists on stage with him for preaching a "Give-to-Get Gospel," Hagee extends the logic to a "Give-to-Get" Zionism. Because Genesis 12 says, "I will bless those who bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee,"

cian works on policy—a trifling thing compared to a preacher who reveals God's prophecies. Hagee's sermon rises into a call and response, "Shout it from the rooftops: 'Israel Lives!'" then dissolves into a hymn before Gingrich approaches the podium.

With such a tough act to follow, the former speaker disappoints. In his bland, technocratic cadence, he relates that 91 percent of Americans believe the words, "Under God" belong in the pledge of allegiance. The congregation grows restless. They came to hear something more moving than agreeable poll numbers. But they rouse when he says, "We don't have a peace process, we have a surrender process" and when he chastises the president, saying that if he were "serious, he'd move our embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem tomorrow." Gingrich sits down, and the Cornerstone Church Orchestra picks up their cue.

A YOUNG MAN DRESSED AS AN AMERICAN SOLDIER COMES OVER, LIFTS UP HIS ISRAELI COUNTERPART, AND SALUTES HIM.

Hagee preaches that "as people, churches, and nations deal with the State of Israel, so God will deal with them." He tells the crowd, with equal parts grin and gruff, "Get ready! Good things are getting ready to happen to you."

But not all is brightness. "There are voices in the U.S. State Department calling for the city of Jerusalem to be divided," Hagee says. The crowd shouts a drawn out "No!" unprompted. "Let's make this clear!" Hagee continues. "There shall be one Jerusalem. Never divided. For any reason. Not now and not ever!"

Hagee has made Washington a focus of his efforts, but his mission is larger than politics. He is not as solicitous to Republican interests as Jerry Falwell was before him; he freely criticizes the president and cabinet members. A politi-

Images of rabbis teaching in Israel flash across giant screens, as the crowd starts to rock and wave, lifting their voices, "Sing Us a Song of Zion." A young man dressed as an IDF soldier appears on the stage. He appears to be hurt and remains on his knees. The music begins to fade. Another young man dressed as an American soldier comes over, lifts up his Israeli counterpart, and salutes him. The hall fills with the sound of the electronic keyboard and the crowd punctures the night air with waving palms and a smattering of "hallelujahs." Some raise tear-streaked faces, others bow their heads in ecstatic prayer, all are resolute and ready for battle. They sing as the music lifts them higher: "Great is the army that carries out His Word." ■

Ex-President McCain

From maverick to heir apparent to aging senator—and it only cost \$28 million.

By David Weigel

JOHN MCCAIN is getting his first lucky break in weeks: I can't get into his conference call. It's only been days since his campaign manager Terry Nelson admitted that only \$2 million was left in the coffers after almost \$30 million had been raised. It's been hours since Nelson, joined by half a dozen high-level officials and 50 low-level McCainiacs, jumped ship. This conference call will be stuffed with smart-aleck journalists who want to nag about those problems. That's certainly what I want to know about when I, along with my fellow hacks, am put on hold.

Lucky for us, the music is "The Flame," that lone #1 hit by Cheap Trick. Listen closely and it sounds like Robin Zander is singing McCain's obituary. "Watching shadows move across the wall, and I feel so frightened..." Verse after verse of power-pop gloom pulses through the receiver. But there is a light at the end of the tunnel: "Remember: after the fire, after all the rain, I will be the flame."

Once the call connects, McCain doesn't say much that hasn't already been serenaded. "We've had financial problems," he admits. "I am responsible for those problems." *The Weekly Standard's* Michael Goldfarb asks how McCain is doing, and the candidate makes light of the sincere question: "In the words of Chairman Mao, it's always darkest before it's totally black." This is not the first time he's told that joke this week.

The tone of the call changes, softens. Maybe it's because the bloggers are sympathetic to McCain, maybe it's because the journalists have already picked out

his headstone. McCain spends most of his time answering questions about the Iraq War, the progress report that will come in September, and the Democrat-led charge for benchmarks.

"I spent this past week on the floor of the Senate managing the defense bill," he says. "I'll be there all next week. I will do whatever is necessary to pass that bill. If I have to take September off, I'll do that."

Presidential candidates don't take September off. Staying in Washington that month might mean forfeiting the race. But McCain didn't want to run another insurgent campaign for president. He wanted to convince the Republican base that he was Bush's natural successor. There's a sense among people who have followed McCain that the strategy worked too well—that as the Bush era sputters to a halt, the McCain era is ending with it.

McCain's campaign team scoffs at that theory. "I just don't buy that," says Patrick Hynes, the web guru who set up the conference call. "It's very clear that guy who ran against Bush in 2000 isn't the successor to George W. Bush."

McCain had his scraps with Bush in 2000 and well into his presidency. He opposed the first round of tax cuts and the White House's relaxed rules on torture. But McCain also spent years improving his relationship with the president and the Republican establishment. He campaigned for Bush in 2004. He barnstormed for even the most hopeless GOP candidates in 2006. As the president's fortunes darkened, McCain defended his character and his resolve. "The relationship has grown warmer

over time," McCain told the *Washington Post* in an August 2006 piece. "We get along very well."

This was always a double-edged strategy. McCain came out of the 2000 campaign with an enviable reputation among political reporters, one that bordered on hero worship. They liked him personally and they loved to watch him turn his guns on fellow Republicans. A 2004 snapshot of McCain bear-hugging Bush with all the joy of a construction grunt hauling a bag of cement became famous. Supportive political pundits pored over it like the Zapruder film, looking for evidence that McCain was uncomfortable, that he was playing along for a couple of years to get the nomination.

Not until the dog days of 2006 did reporters start turning on McCain. He was building a political machine to correct all of the 2000 blunders, and doing that meant allying with the Republican establishment. In March, he hired Nelson, the national political director of the 2004 Bush race. Within a month, he had glad-handed Rev. Jerry Falwell and signed up to give the commencement address at his Liberty University. Pro-McCain journalists were shocked: they'd never had higher esteem for the man than when he compared Falwell and Pat Robertson to Louis Farrakhan and Al Sharpton on the 2000 campaign trail. "Reverend Falwell came to my office and said that he wanted to put our differences behind us," McCain explained. "I was glad to do that."

McCain's cheering section in the press was gobsmacked. *The Daily Show's* Jon Stewart, who'd frequently invited McCain on to dish politics, sounded like

a hopeful young baseball fan who just found out that Shoeless Joe Jackson took bribes: Say it ain't so, John. "Are you freaking out on us?" he asked. "Because if you're freaking out and you're going into the crazy base world—are you going into crazy base world?"

McCain's answer was a joke, but it was telling. "I'm afraid so," he told Stewart. In other words, everything he was doing to mollify the base he was doing with a sly Santa Claus wink. That was how he spent most of 2006, stumping for Republican candidates across the country while broadcasting his superiority to them. In June, as the immigration bill McCain had co-sponsored worked its way through the Senate, California congressional candidate Brian Bilbray slammed it as too weak. McCain cancelled a Bilbray fundraiser. In September, when conservative Rhode Island Senate candidate Steve Laffey was in striking distance of winning the Republican primary, McCain stumped for liberal incumbent Lincoln Chafee. Laffey was shoulder to shoulder with McCain on the Iraq War; Chafee opposed it and infuriated the Republican base. McCain didn't worry about that.

"The line they ran on was 'he's the natural frontrunner,'" says a political consultant who worked for the campaign but turned down a full-time position. "They were telling the base the same thing they were telling senators when they were asking around for endorsements: he'll be the nominee, and you've got to support him. Otherwise, you'll get screwed."

McCain's camp reasoned that they could walk the tightrope between the media and the agitated base because the base wouldn't have a better choice. Mitt Romney was hiring all the talent that wasn't going with McCain and placating conservative voters just as intensely as McCain was tweaking them. McCain's camp identified him as the biggest threat to the nomination and started pounding

away in the primary states. Both candidates lagged Rudy Giuliani in the polls. When he entered the race in January and his lead didn't fade, McCain's team had difficulty adjusting.

"Rudy was always ahead of McCain, but nobody thought it would hold up," says one McCain staffer. "Some of us didn't even think he was going to run. We only realized how serious Rudy was when he entered the race and shot up to 40, 45 percent in the polls."

Still, McCain's organization dwarfed Giuliani's. He was running a national campaign, strong in the first primary states, leading in some of them. The size of the field and number of candidates gave way to a theory that McCain could be the consensus candidate of just enough Republicans to win the early contests, then win it all. His operation in South Carolina, the strongest in the race, was the product of a seven-year obsession by McCain and his longtime operative John Weaver that they would never again lose the state the way they lost it to George W. Bush. McCain officially launched his campaign in April with tours of Iowa and New Hampshire that went rather well.

"When he tried the initial town halls," says a consultant familiar with the campaign, "when he was slamming pork barrel spending and talking global warming, that was a two-week stretch where the campaign established a brand. And then it was extinguished by the immigration stuff."

There's no disagreement about that. The June return of the immigration bill knocked the campaign's legs out. Originally co-sponsored by McCain and Sen. Ted Kennedy, it enraged the Republican base. Fundraising slowed and poll standings crumbled—especially after pollsters included Fred Thompson. Online activists circulated video of South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham—McCain's most loyal backer in the state—calling some bill opponents "bigots." Eleven months after

McCain manager Rick Davis told the *New York Times* that the GOP would anoint McCain because it was "a party that gravitates toward front-runners," the campaign released a face-saving memo: "Wide Open Race & No Clear Front Runner."

McCain learned most of the lessons of the 2000 campaign. He worked, however wincingly, to patch up relations with the base. Though he won't win the White House, he hasn't failed entirely. The last seven years have been more like a McCain presidency than the candidate could have imagined when he finally released his delegates at the Philadelphia convention.

Candidate Bush clearly articulated his stance against McCain's campaign finance reform plan: he favored comprehensive transparency of donations, not red tape. But President Bush signed McCain-Feingold. Candidate Bush rejected McCain's muscular foreign policy of "rogue state rollback" and said he'd only use the military "when it's in our national strategic interests." But President Bush launched two wars and two long occupations. The candidate of the "humble foreign policy" became a president whose moral and historical mission was "ending tyranny in our world."

If it was the immigration bill that finally knocked McCain's campaign off course, it's fitting. That was the one issue where McCain and Bush always saw eye to eye, where they saw themselves as evangelists who could save their party and their country from "nativism" and demographic ruin. For all their disagreements, McCain and Bush had the same vision of what kind of country America could be: a military and cultural colossus with a citizenry aware of its own greatness and a world transformed by it. But that's not the country the Republican base wants to live in. ■

David Weigel is an associate editor of Reason.

Let's Not Go Dutch

Amnesty's track record in Europe should discourage American imitators.

By Paul Belien

AMERICA IS NOT THE ONLY nation debating amnesty for illegal aliens. The issue is a hot topic across the Atlantic as well. On June 8, the Dutch Parliament approved a proposal submitted by Nebahat Albayrak, a Turkish-born member of the Dutch government, to give permanent resident cards to everyone who has been living in the Netherlands since 2001. Albayrak, the junior minister of Justice, who holds dual Dutch-Turkish citizenship, thinks that some 30,000 will benefit from her amnesty, though no one actually knows how many illegal immigrants are in the country.

If previous amnesties in other Western European countries are any indication, the Dutch may be in for a surprise. Two years ago, when Spain announced a collective amnesty for illegal immigrants, the government in Madrid expected that the measure would apply to 300,000 people at most; 800,000 showed up.

Belgium had a similar experience in January 2000, when it granted papers to everyone who had been living in the country illegally for the previous six years. Brussels thought there were 20,000 illegal aliens, but 50,000 applied for amnesty, providing documents, such as doctor's prescriptions, to prove that they had been living in Belgium in 1994. In 1998, when the Italian government announced an amnesty for what was expected to be "fewer than 38,000" illegal immigrants, it had to hand out residence permits to a staggering 220,000.

Amnesties for illegal immigrants take place at regular intervals in Europe. Each time a government grants one, they invariably say that this will be the last and that from now on all illegal newcomers will be expelled. Of course that never happens.

Since 1974, Western Europe has given permanent resident cards to over 5 million illegal immigrants. France has granted three major amnesties in the past 25 years. Spain has offered six in the past 15 years. Italy voted amnesties in 1988, 1990, 1996, 1998, and 2002. Last year, it agreed on another one that allowed over 500,000 people to stay—a figure the government now wants to expand to 1 million. All these countries belong to the European Union, where there is free movement of persons. An amnesty in one country allows the formerly illegal immigrant to move to other EU member states as well.

The largest collective amnesties have been given in Spain, Italy, and Greece. These EU member states, directly bordering Africa and Asia along the Mediterranean, hope that once an illegal alien has obtained his residence permit he will leave for more affluent welfare states like Germany, Britain, or Scandinavia. The immigrants can legally emigrate to a Shangri-La elsewhere in Europe. And, indeed, most of them do.

In the Netherlands, however, the situation is different. The tulip kingdom by the North Sea is as close to paradise as a welfare seeker can get. Those who obtain permission to stay in Holland do not move on, as they have already

tapped one of the richest welfare bonanzas on the continent. Hence the puzzling question: why have the Dutch, who had relatively strict immigration policies until the present government took over last February, suddenly decided to open the floodgates? One of the reasons is the role played by someone granted an American green card last year.

Dutch politics resemble a pendulum. From very liberal until the turn of the century, they swung dramatically to the right in the wake of the murders of Pim Fortuyn, a homosexual politician who favored immigration restriction, and Theo van Gogh, an anarchist moviemaker, in 2002 and 2004 respectively. In the resulting shock, the Dutch had to face the fact that many of their newly arrived neighbors were unwilling to accept Holland's traditional liberal tolerance.

Consequently, the strict policies of Rita Verdonk, the minister for integration and immigration in the previous center-right government, initially drew almost unanimous support. "*Nederland is vol*" (The Netherlands are full), the Dutch said. "Iron Rita," a former prison director and head of the state security services, aimed to discourage any non-European fortune seeker from entering, and for a while, the Netherlands had the most uncompromising immigration policies in Europe. Verdonk, a member of the center-right Dutch Liberal Party VVD, even expelled alleged asylum seekers who had already acquired permanent resident cards and sometimes

even Dutch citizenship. She took their cards and their citizenship away if they had lied about their real identities or true reasons for entering the country. According to Verdonk, there was no place in Dutch society for people who cheated their way in.

Though Verdonk was reviled by political opponents as a far-right populist, she retained her party's support until May of last year when it was discovered that Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the most famous Dutch politician at home and abroad and a member of Verdonk's own VVD, was one of the cheaters who had lied their way into the Netherlands and Dutch citizenship.

Ali had come to the Netherlands in 1992 and had obtained political asylum because she claimed to have arrived directly from war-torn Somalia. In reality, although born in Somalia to a prominent, wealthy family, she had been living in Kenya and Germany for the previous 12 years. To disguise her real identity, she used a false name, calling herself Ali instead of Magan, her real name. She also gave the Dutch authorities a false date of birth.

While in the Netherlands, Magan, from then on known as Ali, studied politics. A few years later, she became a Dutch citizen. She gained a reputation as an outspoken critic of Islam and of religion in general and as an activist for women's rights, including abortion. In 2003, she was elected a member of the Dutch Parliament. One year later, she became a global icon of resistance to Islamism when van Gogh was murdered by a Muslim fanatic who left death threats for her on his body. Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali had just finished making a movie entitled "Submission," about discrimination against women in Muslim societies. They were planning a second movie, "Submission 2," about the "Muslim intolerance towards homosexuals."

For the liberal Dutch, and indeed for many elsewhere in the West, including *Reader's Digest*, which elected her "European of the Year," Ali became the Jeanne d'Arc of liberal secularism against Islamism. But when, in May of last year, Dutch television revealed that Magan aka Ali had given false information to enter the Netherlands, Minister Verdonk declared that the immigration rules applied to her as much as to others. Since Ali had committed "identity fraud," she had not legitimately acquired Dutch citizenship, Verdonk argued. She moved to annul her citizenship, whereupon Ali resigned from Parliament. The pro-immigration but anti-Muslim politician announced that she was leaving for the United States to become a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

In the Netherlands, the sudden departure of the "European of the Year" brought a political backlash against Verdonk, who was blamed for chasing the "most famous and courageous Dutch citizen" away. When Iron Rita refused to resign, the government collapsed. The next general elections were won by the Left, which promised an amnesty for illegal aliens as well as for those who had been turned down by Verdonk.

The new Dutch government, a coalition of the Christian-Democrat Party and the Labor Party, is the first government in the Netherlands with immigrant ministers. In addition to Nebahat Albayrak, there is also Ahmed Aboutaleb, secretary of social affairs and employment, who holds dual Moroccan-Dutch citizenship. Both politicians belong to Labor, a party that caters for the immigrant vote.

Rita Verdonk, now marginalized even within her own party, has warned that Albayrak's amnesty might attract up to half a million asylum seekers. But the government is not inclined to listen. Verdonk's previous post has gone to Ella

Vogelaar, another Labor member, who says that the Netherlands, so far a country of Judeo-Christian traditions, is gradually becoming a "Judeo-Christian-Islamic" society, a process she considers beneficial. Wouter Bos, the Labor Party leader, who is the current Dutch minister of finance, recently said that he wants to turn the Netherlands into an international center of Sharia banking, next to Dubai and London.

Minister Albayrak told Parliament that the amnesty for everyone who has been living in the Netherlands since 2001 implies that illegal aliens who entered after 2001 have to be expelled. But she knows that this is not going to happen because the government needs the collaboration of the local authorities to track down illegal aliens. Many mayors, especially those belonging to Albayrak's own Labor Party, have already announced that they will refuse to assist the government in their search for the immigrants.

Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, The Hague, and Eindhoven—the five largest cities in the country—refuse to "organize manhunts on illegal immigrants." Ernst Bakker, the mayor of Hilversum, the town where Fortuyn was murdered, told the Dutch press that providing the list of illegal aliens to the government amounts to "betrayal, informing." It reminds him of "Nazi methods."

Some Americans might be inclined to think that an amnesty for illegal immigrants who have already been living in the country for many years might be a good idea, on the condition that it be the final one. But the European experience teaches us that governments always underestimate the number of people who can apply for an amnesty, and that amnesties do not close floodgates, they open them. ■

Paul Belien is editor of The Brussels Journal.

Nothing Doing

Taking time to be human in a workaholic world

By Brent Kallmer

I HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT Louis Armstrong's "What a Wonderful World" contained one of the most bogus assertions ever put to music: "I see friends shaking hands, saying 'how do you do' / They're really saying, 'I love you.'"

Not in D.C. they aren't. Here they're really saying, as they deftly produce a business card, "I'm the director of legislative affairs. What do you do?"

The city exerts siren's attraction on the sharpest political junkies, many of whom had already been involved in significant voter fraud by the time they reached the fifth grade. Every evening, a drama unfolds as the office exodus commences. Young people in business suits dart through the omni-directional foot traffic, careworn faces locked on their BlackBerries. They are on their way to the post-work gauntlet of happy hours, networking events, meet-and-greets, spinning classes, and yoga. It is an active leisure, to be sure.

Josef Pieper (1904-97), one of the most important philosophers of the last century, had some choice words on this topic in his *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*. Turns out we moderns have it exactly backward: for the Ancients, leisure, not work, was the thing—and one of the foundations of civilization.

According to Pieper, the Greeks and Romans believed that "we are unleisurely in order to have leisure." This leisure is not just an absence of work, nor is it an inevitable consequence of our free time, such as it is. They were no doubt assuming a more expansive vision than "working for the weekend." For them, leisure was a positive reality, a

frame of mind in which, by looking beyond the cares and anxieties of our daily world, we would paradoxically become more human.

This is because, for Pieper, as for Aquinas, leisure presupposes an assent to our humanity and our world. Those who refuse to accept the human condition are thus said to suffer from *acedia*, a kind of sloth that in Kierkegaard's words amounts to a "despairing refusal to be oneself." In this understanding, even the workaholic can be an idler, a person who, in rejecting the truth of his humanity, papers over that reality with frenzied labor. Aquinas further argued that idleness was the enemy not of work but of leisure and went so far as to call it a transgression of the third commandment's injunction to rest on the Sabbath.

The concept of leisure is also essential to the distinction between what were traditionally known as the *artes serviles* and the *artes liberales*. The liberal arts are—properly speaking—useless. Aquinas, in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, puts it this way: "Only those arts are called liberal or free which are concerned with knowledge; those which are concerned with utilitarian ends that are attained through activity, however, are called servile."

The Medievals additionally made a distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus*. *Ratio* was understood to be that form of searching thought that examines, dissects, and reaches conclusions. *Intellectus*, on the other hand, was the form that apprehends reality effortlessly, in which "truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye."

Knowledge was thought to be a function of both facets. *Intellectus*, however, was considered beyond the properly human, a kind of participation in the divine way of knowing enjoyed by pure spirits. It formed the basis of the *vita contemplative*—the contemplative life—whose devoted practitioners Aquinas saw as the leaven of the good society.

Kant found this kind of enterprise—contemplative thought—fairly dubious, mainly because it seemed to require so little of the thinker. His "no pain, no gain" way of looking at knowledge has grown deep roots in the modern mind, which hates the idea of knowledge as an unmerited gift.

The idiosyncratic economist Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) had his own rather depressing take on leisure, famously expressed in his *Theory of the Leisure Class*. In brief, Veblen argued that the rich had succeeded not only in ripping off the toiling masses but also in making their predation seem the most dignified mode of life; their leisure was all the more enjoyable because it elicited the envy of the less affluent. At bottom, said Veblen, it was a superficially palatable form of savagery.

So perhaps it is not so surprising that these days the idea of leisure makes us uncomfortable. To engage in it seems to toy with outright laziness. Maybe there is a secret suspicion that if we step back from things, even for a moment, we might find ourselves waking up one day in a pile of empty Funyun bags and with an encyclopedic knowledge of Bob Saget's career.

The best we can do is to view leisure as a respite from our daily burdens, a recharging of the batteries. And so, unsurprisingly, many of us turn to "wellness," the cheerful mantra of New Agers, health clubs, and organic grocery stores. It is uncontroversial enough—do you know anyone opposed to wellness?—but it is so vague as to leave

people in perpetual doubt as to what it in fact is and whether they have achieved it. So we get “wellness goals,” the accomplishment of which undoubtedly involves shelling out a bunch of money for detox treatments supervised by some self-styled guru.

The wellness craze draws its force from giving exercise and diet a veneer of transcendent meaning—a sort of vanity cult whose liturgy takes the form of spa treatments and personal training sessions. But it seems also to be a legitimate response to the concept of total work, a way of regaining some sense of balance. This hits on another point made by Pieper: celebration, and especially divine worship, is essential to leisure. It requires entering a place where “calculation is thrown to the winds and wealth deliberately squandered.”

He continues, “Separated from the sphere of divine worship, of the cult of the divine, and from the power it radiates, leisure is as impossible as the celebration of a feast. Cut off from the worship of the divine, leisure becomes laziness and work inhuman.” We can invent sham feast days unrelated or perhaps even opposed to the divine, but these inevitably devolve into boredom in the same way wellness eventually reveals itself to be a form of workaholism.

In the end, we can’t help wanting to find a place where the clock ceases to be an enemy, where we can do something wholly gratuitous, something “good for nothing”—not in the same way that, say, reality television is good for nothing, but in a utilitarian sense. And while it’s hard to know what the insights of an Aristotle, an Augustine, or an Aquinas—insights born of leisure—would go for on the open market, we must admit that whatever price they fetched would certainly be too little. ■

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Democracy Delusion

The misconception that values won the Cold War

By Andrew A. Michta

FOR CLOSE TO TWO DECADES, under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has followed a security policy built around the ideology of democratic universalism and implemented through residual Cold War institutions. Unlike 1945-47, when vigorous debate prefigured the containment strategy, the post-Cold War years have seen little introspection and plenty of confidence. Instead of George Kennan and Walter Lippmann’s debate over national interests, we got Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” and Charles Krauthammer’s “unipolar moment.”

It is a cliché to say that victory can be fraught with more danger than defeat, but the aftermath of America’s triumph in the Cold War may prove the maxim’s merit.

The scope of our success was breathtaking: not only did the United States avert an actual war with the Soviet Union, but by 1989, communism had been so discredited that it imploded across the Soviet empire. The totality of that victory and the rapid transition of the post-communist world to democracy enticed American elites to believe in the universal applicability of our political institutions and our cultural reference points.

We emerged from the Cold War with no peer competitor, no immediate security threats, and a feeling of unprecedented power. That sense of a preponderant America liberated from its Soviet counterweight translated into a newly assertive foreign policy—and a new impatience with the complexities of world affairs. Efforts to reduce the United States’ international commit-

ments were caricatured as “isolationist.”

A clear indication that democratic ideology now drove policy was the rapid expansion of American commitments in Europe—and the rapid expansion of NATO, our chosen vehicle for democratizing post-communist states. In two cycles of enlargement since the end of the Cold War, NATO has added ten new members, notwithstanding their failure to meet the requisite military capabilities and an absence of consensus among the allies about the nature of NATO’s new mission. Though the United States insists on the “expeditionary” NATO, a large number of the key old European allies have a different vision of its future. And those new allies who follow the American lead by contributing forces offer support mainly as a *quid pro quo* for American security guarantees against resurgent Russia.

Amid rising tensions in NATO, American security commitments have continued to grow. Several policy landmarks defined the expansive post-Cold War policy. In the Middle East, after the 1990 Gulf War, the first Bush administration abandoned offshore balancing, opting instead for a large American military footprint in the region. In the Balkans, the Clinton administration relied on American power to stop ethnic violence, but rejected ethnic consolidation as a path to security. The resultant NATO/EU Balkan protectorate will endure as long as there is an open-ended commitment of allied resources.

The final step in replacing realism with democratic universalism came after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, when

the Bush administration declared that indefinite war against terrorism would be the country's primary national-security goal.

The unlimited scope of the global war on terror was matched by its equally striking conceptual confusion, with the conflict cast as an epic existential struggle between freedom and "Islamofascism." In an environment in which you are "either with us or with the terrorists," discussion is all but foreclosed.

The dilemma the United States faces today is not one of empire in the sense critics often invoke. Rather, we have embarked on a revolutionary course to transform not only power relations between states but also their domestic politics. The idea of exporting democracy to the Middle East and the neoconservative argument that American security depends on a "modernized" Arab world are nothing short of radical. The ideology at the heart of this transformative project mixes the most fundamental American values with a basic misunderstanding of how societies and cultures evolve.

Not until the end of the Cold War did democratic universalism become a catch-all, officially sanctioned solution to America's global challenges. Since then, successive U.S. administrations have narrowed the band of systemic differences they were prepared to accept. American policy has found ambiguity in world affairs increasingly intolerable, declaring instead the imperative to "restore communities," "modernize" cultures, win "battles for hearts and minds," and "nation build," in order to create a "world that favors freedom."

This rhetoric does not correspond to reality. Democratic transition requires broad-based public consensus that new institutions are historically legitimate and can be framed within a given cultural context. This has been overwhelmingly the case in post-communist Europe, where actual democratic transi-

tions were far more complicated than the institutional modeling suggests. The core contributing factors were the presence of emerging civil society and of legitimate political elites who supported the transition. Neither exists in Iraq.

In the two cases of successful "democratization from above," Germany and Japan, complete defeat in war followed by unconditional surrender formed the foundation for change. And both countries had a security imperative to work with the United States to defend against the Soviet and Chinese communist threats. Most importantly, in both cases, internal conditions favored systemic regime change. Germany had a history of nascent if ineffective democratic governance predating the Nazis. It shared Western cultural and religious traditions, and it had nationally recognized leaders who were able to articulate the country's democratic future. Legitimate leadership was likewise essential in Japan's transition, where the emperor, having renounced his divinity, remained as the symbol of continuity between the nation's past and its future.

In post-communist Europe, democracy took root because it was synonymous with independence, national self-determination, and security. There were both grassroots support and a strong elite consensus that joining the West constituted a historically legitimate path.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq, on the other hand, never accounted for the political history and culture of the Middle East. The full regional impact and long-term global consequences of this folly are not yet in sight. Neither have the full domestic political implications and economic costs been assessed. But in one area, the message from Iraq seems clear: the war has exposed the inherent limitations of Democratic Peace Theory as the underpinning of the administration's transformative policy.

That theory, which in the early '90s migrated from academic discourse to American policy debates, argues that democracies are not likely to go to war with one another. Its appeal has been all but irresistible, for it purports to explain political change and drive policy, even if the Kantian argument is reduced to a PowerPoint slide in the process.

The 2005 Congressional Advance Democracy Act declared, "wars between or among democratic countries are exceedingly rare, while wars between and among nondemocratic countries [are] commonplace." Similar assertions have become staples of successive post-Cold War pronouncements.

In the 1990s, as discussions of "institutionalizing democratic peace" proliferated in think tanks, advocacy groups, and in government, American universities experienced a precipitous decline in their Area Studies programs. They have all but given up on preparing regional specialists fluent in foreign languages and versed in different cultures—the type of education that was essential to our success against the Soviet Union. Instead, they turn out expert module builders capable of running Linde equations on data sets but largely indifferent to the most basic cultural realities of the countries they profess to research. Rational Choice and similar theories that promised to make political science truly "scientific" became the doorway to university tenure. Thus the argument for the Iraq War was forged not by Middle East experts keenly aware of the constraints imposed by the region's history and culture but by "regime changers" and "nation builders," who could not put together a coherent Arabic sentence and whose knowledge of the region derived from government briefings.

The tragedy of Sept. 11 transformed the democratic creed into a global democratic ideology. In the heat of the moment, the neoconservative blend of

hard power and Wilsonianism seemed to offer clear answers, and with few exceptions, both Democrats and Republicans signed on without asking how expending national power on a refurbished Wilsonian dream was going to make Americans safer in the 21st century. Few questioned how core democratic values that had evolved over the centuries of the Western liberal tradition could be transplanted into a Muslim community defined by ethnic and sectarian divisions.

The consequences have been dire for the U.S., our global prestige, and for the Iraqis themselves. The functioning Iraqi state, albeit run by a nasty dictator, has been dismantled and thrown into chaos. The country that used to be the regional counterweight to Iran has been knocked out by American power. (Lest we forget, during the Iran-Iraq War, the West, as well as the Soviet Union, expended considerable energy to deny victory to either side). Four years of fighting have degraded the power of the U.S. military, while Iran has gained more freedom of action to pursue its nuclear program and strengthen its position in the region.

The Middle East is only part of the gathering storm on the horizon. Despite our dominant economic position, we face serious internal imbalances that could further constrain our ability to protect our national interests. The national debt stands at \$8.8 trillion—almost 70 percent of the 2006 GDP—and increases \$1.5 billion per day. Though the U.S. will remain a superpower for the next several years, its ability to secure its interests will be in jeopardy unless its foreign policy returns to realism.

Moreover, the U.S.-European transatlantic relationship is no longer working according to the old rules. For European governments, unity with the U.S. is no longer the objective it once was, and they are becoming evermore selective in following Washington's lead. The United States no longer enjoys a large natural

constituency in Europe, and Iraq has underscored this new American weakness. Even if Europe had the political will to work with the U.S. in the Middle East and Asia, it lacks the capacity for sustained military deployments.

Meanwhile, Russia, awash in oil and gas revenues, is back in the game in both Europe and Eurasia, ready to flex its muscles as Vladimir Putin announced in Munich earlier this year and underscored in confrontations with Russia's neighboring states in the post-Soviet sphere.

In Asia, China's power will continue to expand, subsidized by increasingly de-Westernized economic globalization.

Other than hope that China's economic development will eventually lead to democracy, Democratic Peace Theory has little to offer in response to this shift in global power. Likewise, democratic universalism is irrelevant to challenges like devolving U.S.-European relations, the resurgence of Russia, and our inability to stabilize the Middle East.

If a new Western consensus is to emerge, America must foster regional stability instead of pursuing the current transformative agenda. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we need to recognize that regional problems cannot be divorced from our past and present policy choices or solved without the involvement of key regional players. We need to review our international commitments and eliminate those that offer only marginal value not commensurate with the cost.

And a return to realism in foreign policy has to include fiscal responsibility and rebuilding the economic base at home, including an energy policy that will wean the nation off imported oil. For our policy in the Middle East, this means returning to off-shore balancing in the short-term to ensure continued access to oil; in the long term, it requires America's progressive disengagement from the region in order to regain greater freedom of action.

For transatlantic relations, the return to realism means a serious reassessment of America's place in NATO. Alliances are about shared threats and interests, while "fostering communities of values" is merely derivative. Since 1990, the United States and the Europeans have maintained that NATO can transform itself and remain the premier security organization in the world. But after two cycles of enlargement, in 1999 and 2004, the alliance has grown to 26 members that, with the exception of the U.S., France, and Great Britain, have only limited deployable military capabilities and, except for Canada, Poland, Romania, Denmark, and the Netherlands, lack the political will to make meaningful contributions to U.S.-led out-of-area operations.

America's present international predicament has been caused by a synergy of trends, some obvious, others difficult to anticipate. The ideology of democratic universalism reached its pinnacle with the "neoconservative moment" and in the unquestioned embrace of globalization as the panacea for the nation's fiscal irresponsibility. But the post-Cold War era in U.S. foreign policy is fast coming to a close. It will be critical to our future security to speak honestly about our global overcommitment and make the necessary adjustments.

The United States is the most powerful republic in history, but the supposed universality of our values doesn't inoculate us from the realities of international power relations. ■

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Arts & Letters

FILM

[Sunshine]

Talk, Talk Against the Dying of the Light

By Steve Sailer

ON MAY 28, 1942, the *USS Yorktown* aircraft carrier, badly damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea, squeezed into a Pearl Harbor dry dock needing an estimated 90 days of repair. But with four Japanese carriers steaming toward Midway Island, 1,400 repairmen swarmed over her, using so much electricity that Honolulu had to be partially blacked out. Two days later, the *Yorktown* sailed off to the decisive battle of the War in the Pacific.

On Jan. 16, 2003, a chunk of foam broke off the space shuttle *Columbia* during liftoff. NASA engineers asked their managers to have a spy satellite scope out the damage, but the higher-ups assumed, wrongly, that America couldn't improvise a repair or rescue during the 30 days the crew could survive in orbit, so why bother? Two weeks later, the *Columbia* disintegrated upon re-entry.

During the golden age of science fiction in the middle of the 20th century, the predominant plot—the space voyage—was essentially an updated sea story. (It's no coincidence that the greatest American science-fiction writer,

Robert A. Heinlein, who was born 100 years ago this summer, was an invalided U.S. naval officer.) Classic “hard” science fiction reflected the can-do culture of an era exemplified by the *Yorktown* repairs and going to the Moon in eight years.

We now live in a can't-do age, when merely building a fence along the border strikes our leaders as beyond our nation's capabilities.

“Sunshine” is a medium-budget (\$40 million) science-fiction thriller with art-house pretensions. Eight astronauts on a last-chance-for-mankind mission try to reignite the dying sun with a “stellar bomb” the size of Manhattan. The movie falls uncomfortably between the grand heroism of the old sci-fi and the petty self-absorption of our reality-television shows.

Granted, the physics of the premise are unworkable—for one thing, it takes a half million years for light to jostle its way out from the dense solar core to the surface, so by the time we noticed anything was wrong with the sun, it would be too late—but some of the film's conceptions of how much the freezing folks back on Earth could do if they had to are thrillingly old-fashioned. For instance, this bomb is humanity's final hope because “all the fissile material on Earth has been mined” to make it.

On the other hand, by 2057, NASA appears to have delegated personnel selection to a TV network. The crewmembers of *Icarus II* look great but display all the competence, cohesiveness, and cool-headedness of a losing tribe on “Survivor.” With the oxygen running out, they sit and debate whether it's morally justified to kill one person to save the entire species. (Uh, yup.) “Sunshine” isn't quite as inane as last year's apocalyptic “Children of

Men,” which kept getting distracted from its plot about saving humanity from extinction to protest the plight of illegal immigrants, but it's close.

Only the crewcut engineer (Chris Evans, the Human Torch in “Fantastic Four”) has the fighter jock personality you need when a man's gotta do what a man's gotta do. As Murphy's Law sets in with a vengeance, he has the right stuff to lead his squabbling, dithering colleagues, such as the pretty-boy physicist (Cillian Murphy), who, for unexplained reasons, is the only one trained to set off the detonation.

“Sunshine” reunites Murphy with director Danny Boyle and screenwriter Alex Garland. Together, they revived the zombie genre with 2002's “28 Days Later.” Many critics are praising the derivative “Sunshine,” presumably because it's fun for cineastes to play “Spot the Influence” of space and submarine classics such as “2001,” “Solaris,” “Alien,” and “Das Boot.”

In contrast, sci-fi fans will find their intelligence insulted by the careless plotting. In last year's “Thank You for Smoking,” a tobacco lobbyist and a Hollywood agent conspire to have the heroes of an upcoming sci-fi blockbuster smoke in space:

Nick Naylor: “But wouldn't they blow up in an all-oxygen environment?”

Jeff Megall: “Probably. But it's an easy fix. One line of dialogue. ‘Thank God we invented the ... you know, whatever device.’”

The makers of “Sunshine,” though, just don't care enough about science fiction to hire a script doctor to make the easy fixes. Like too many films these days, it ends up being just another movie about movies, which “2001,” for all its pompous flaws, definitely was not. ■

Rated R for violent content and language.

BOOKS

[*The Prince of Darkness: 50 Years Reporting in Washington*, Robert D. Novak, Crown Forum, 672 pages]

Novak Gets the Scoop on Novak

By Robert W. Merry

SOME 36 YEARS AGO, when I was a student at Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism, I received a visit from a college chum who had become a congressional reporter for the Associated Press. I welcomed the visit because I harbored an almost desperate ambition to get to Washington myself and emerge as a prominent political writer. "Who in Washington," I asked my friend, "do you absolutely have to read to stay on top of what's going on?"

The unhesitating answer: "Evans and Novak."

Three years later, I got a job as a Washington reporter for a national newspaper, and I asked myself the same question. I gave myself the same answer.

I identified two reasons that the late Rowland Evans Jr. and Robert D. Novak offered the capital's most indispensable journalistic fare: first, they elevated their column far above polemics; and, second, they were both brilliant reporters. Indeed, Novak—the younger of the two and described by many as a rumpled "Front Page" type with a dour demeanor and pugnacious temperament—is arguably one of the greatest reporters to emerge in postwar Washington.

Novak has dispensed more inside information through the cultivation of more high-level sources over a longer period of time than any other Washington reporter of his generation—and he's still at it after a half-century on the job.

Now we have his memoir, a thick bundle of historical sweep, brutal self-

assessment, sharp insights into the reporter's trade and ways of Washington, and defiant candor about who in town he considers to have been good guys and who were jerks and phonies. It's a remarkable book emanating from a remarkable career. Over the last 40 years, only Arthur Krock and Katharine Graham have produced journalistic memoirs this meaty and revealing.

Novak's book also offers a few hints into what I have long considered the central paradox of his career—how did this man, who assiduously cultivated a persona as a kind of "Peck's Bad Boy" outsider, become one of Washington's most successful insiders?

I must note, by way of full disclosure, that I am not writing this from afar. I have known Novak for some three decades. Although ours is not the kind of close friendship in which the parties regularly seek each other out, we have been tossed together frequently, and with apparent mutual enjoyment, at receptions, dinner parties, and campaign events. The word that best captures the man, in my experience, is "compelling," like his column and this book.

He grew up in Joliet, Illinois, the son of second-generation, middle-class Jews, who instilled in young Robert an "addiction" to politics and a passion for news. Though the extended family embraced Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal throughout the Depression, Bob's parents remained steadfast Republicans. Their son followed suit, becoming at age 9 a Wendell Willkie backer during the Indiana industrialist's hopeless 1940 campaign against Roosevelt.

In high school, a failure on the athletic field, he became manager of the track team and dutifully penned accounts of track meets for the town newspaper. A career was born. Soon he was stringing for that local publication and writing for his school paper. When he entered the University of Illinois, he set his sights on becoming sports editor of the student daily, a position that conferred substantial status on campus.

To his dismay, he was aced out. Here Novak's narrative veers into a remarkable

passage of self-awareness. At his fraternity, he reveals, "there was private rejoicing that I got what I deserved for my arrogance." The younger frat brothers detested him, it seems, and one poor fellow, the butt of Novak abuse "for his lack of sophistication," couldn't wipe the smile off his face. Says Novak with severe matter-of-factness, "I am not a person who is easy for a lot of people to like."

Stung by the defeat, he plunged into journalism with a dedication and relentlessness that have become hallmarks of his career. His only respite from the craft was an Army tour, during which he came under the spell of Whittaker Chambers's famous memoir, *Witness*, which rendered him a Cold War hawk with a deep sense of the epic challenge then facing America and the West. For decades, this struggle gave him his only truly animating political sentiment. He regarded nearly all other issues with a detachment befitting the journalistic sensibility.

His early career was meteoric. Following two brief heartland assignments for the AP, he landed in Washington at age 26 to cover Congress. Here the paradox of his personality again comes into focus. Though he remained unlikable to many, those never seemed to include the people best positioned to advance his career. He proved brilliant at cultivating high-level sources and getting himself invited into their inner sanctums.

He was spotted by the *Wall Street Journal*, then a rising publication with great ambitions but hardly the newspaper of today's reach and scope. In the fall of 1958, he became the paper's Senate correspondent and political reporter. The *Journal* gave him a wider reportorial ambit, and soon he was dispensing not only fresh information (scoops of varying magnitude) but penetrating insights into the personalities and back-room maneuverings inside Washington.

His big break came four years later when he received a call from Rowland Evans, whom he hardly knew. Evans, a bit of an aristocrat from the Philadelphia Main Line, was a correspondent for the old *New York Herald Tribune* and a close friend of the Kennedys. He had

been offered a *Herald Trib* column and needed a collaborator. He chose Novak for his manifest reportorial brilliance and prodigious work habits.

The column was an instant success, in part because it was adjudged as being neither Right nor Left. *Newsweek* called them “the hottest political-reporting team since the Alsop brothers split up.” And even as late as 1968, one profile writer accepted the columnists’ self-descriptions—Novak as “moderate conservative and registered Republican” and Rowly as “moderate liberal and independent politically.”

But politics were changing, and so was the column. As the Democratic Party moved left in the 1970s, Evans and Novak moved right. Along the way, Novak produced a seminar paper at Ohio’s Kenyon College arguing that the Washington press corps had coalesced into a liberal establishment with an ideological commitment to certain leftwing axioms. With this apostasy, he became a marked man for the Left, including the Washington press corps that denied adamantly that it was on the Left at all.

Thus the column, and particularly Novak, took on a new identity—and ever greater controversy. That intensified after Evans retired in 1993 and Novak’s combativeness came to the fore. Contributing to this as well was the move to television, which brought substantial new income as the column’s newspaper presence began a slow decline. Increasingly, television demanded sharply delineated characters of Right and Left, and that further accentuated Novak’s image as a pugnacious partisan of dark proclivities.

Eventually, all this caught up with him. The Valerie Plame episode brought torrents of liberal abuse upon his head, much of it tendentious and most of it unfair, but it took a toll nonetheless. *National Review*, in perhaps its most reprehensible piece ever, accused him of hating his country, as manifest in his mild critique of the neoconservative rationale for plunging America into the Iraq War. He lost his cool on CNN’s “Crossfire,” walked off the set, and lost his lucrative network sinecure.

As the book comes to a close, we see the career arc of a man who had leveraged the reportorial arts and a knack for personality journalism into fame and wealth on an almost unprecedented scale—and then saw a progressive erosion overtake his standing and his income. The CNN relationship that he lost, for example, was bringing in \$625,000 a year (part of an income of \$1.2 million in 2004). “Few honors had been bestowed upon me,” writes Novak, “and I expected none at the end of my career.” He adds, “Thanks to the CIA leak case, I came over as more disreputable than ever.”

My first encounter with Novak the man was not auspicious. Shortly after I began my career in Washington, I found myself at a reception at the University of Michigan, part of a visit there by President Gerald Ford. I joined a group of well-known journalists standing around drinking and caviling in the reporters’ mode. Since I had never met most of them and knew one or two only vaguely, I felt a bit ill at ease—a feeling that took on added intensity when Novak, standing to my left, slowly and deftly maneuvered me out of the group. As I stood sipping my bourbon and staring at his back, I conjured up a term to describe the man.

As I got to know him better, I gained some perspective on that paradox of the bad boy-cum-consummate insider. If you can enlighten him, amuse him, or stir his passion for fresh insight into the ways of Washington, he’s utterly charming and right there with you; if you can’t, you don’t exist. This trait, not particularly exemplary on a personal level, served him well as a reporter. The book notes numerous instances when he quickly abandoned potential sources who weren’t worth his time. And, as he notes of his relationship with younger Washington scribes, he was “not in the practice of mentoring young journalists.”

This self-portrait reveals a man whose passions reside very near the surface. He wasn’t merely a University of Maryland basketball fan; he sought to attend every game, home and away. He wasn’t just a social drinker; for much of his

adult life, he downed eight highballs a day—and more alcohol still if he attended a reception, dinner party, or was on the road. He didn’t simply enjoy sports wagers; at one point he was placing \$1,000 in bets a day. He didn’t just get his back up when crossed; he displayed a propensity for fisticuffs. He didn’t just cover Washington in the dedicated manner of most of his peers; he invested more hours a day and more concentrated effort than just about anyone else.

This proclivity for pushing the envelope drove his reporting career. Seemingly unmoved by mushy thoughts about journalism’s hallowed commitment to civic compassion and justice, Novak the columnist was all about just getting the story motivated by a desire to occasionally “stir up strife,” borrowing the phrase from Dante’s *Inferno*. He seemed untroubled by the messy elements of the craft in Washington’s cozy and sometimes tainted habitat.

Thus when a friend slipped him some information on the condition that he lie about its origin, he complied. When a female academic provided a hot quote on background, he shrouded her identity by referring to her as “he” in second reference. When Nixon operative Chuck Colson gave him a story with the proviso that he write that Colson declined to talk to him, he did so.

Novak brings a searing honesty to his discussion of the reporter-source relationship in Washington. “Reporters—much less columnists—do not attack their sources,” he writes, and recounts numerous instances of this symbiotic relationship. But he also mentions many instances when his reportorial honesty destroyed or strained relationships with sources, including some of the best sources of his career and at least one close friend (including Newt Gingrich and Jack Kemp).

More intriguing were the sources with whom he maintained longtime cordial relations. These included Hubert Humphrey, Barry Goldwater, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Everett Dirksen, Russell Long, the FBI’s William Sullivan, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Some of his best sources were more obscure. One particularly interesting example was John Carbeau, an operative for North Carolina's Republican Sen. Jesse Helms. Most reporters considered Helms and Carbeau disreputable. Thus, while Novak's good friend Albert R. Hunt was penning a devastating profile of Carbeau in the *Wall Street Journal*, Novak was cultivating him—and receiving thick manila envelopes stuffed with sensitive diplomatic information.

It has become fashionable in Washington to view Novak as a shill for Republicans, but a close reading of his work and the anecdotes in this book belie that entirely. The best counter-evidence was the action of young Fred Hiatt, who took over as *Washington Post* editorial page editor in 2000. He told Novak he had contemplated discontinuing the column as a relic of the past, but changed his mind after reading it more closely. He said, writes Novak, "he found it worthwhile because it was based on reporting and always contained something new." Adds Novak, "I thought it was just about the nicest professional compliment ever paid me."

For all of his intellect and analytical capacity, Novak the historian doesn't make a major effort to get beneath the surface of events. He identifies a number of significant historical developments—the decline of Washington civility, the realignment in the political parties' relative power, the decay of television news—but doesn't probe them at depth. Like the columnist, the historian is focused primarily on the personalities and machinations of official Washington.

But on those terms, he provides insight and displays a severe assessment of the presidents he covered:

Eisenhower: "I was on the wrong side," writes Novak, when he favored Ike over Ohio Sen. Robert Taft for the GOP nomination in 1952.

Kennedy: "a failed president"

Johnson: "a disaster"

Nixon: "a fraud ... a make-believe tough guy ... a poor president and a bad man who inflicted grave damage on his

party and his country"

Ford: "had no public purpose"

Carter: "a habitual liar"

Reagan: "the first truly successful president since Franklin Roosevelt"

Bush 41: "He seemed goofy" in '92.

Clinton: "a man of the left who disguised himself as a man of the center"

Novak offers no pungent quote on George W. Bush, but makes clear he considers the Iraq War a grievous mistake, and he suggests the president bears considerable responsibility for his party having run out of things to say to the electorate. He suspects the GOP is about to experience a long decline.

It's been a lustrous career for Robert Novak—all the more so because he so boldly courted the controversy that undermined his standing in so many quarters. No doubt his detractors will cling to the caricature they so erroneously constructed over the years in their refusal to see the multifarious complexities of their nemesis. But for those who want to know who he really is and who want a fascinating window on Washington over the past half century, this book is indispensable. Seldom do so many pages fly by so delightfully. ■

Robert W. Merry is president and editor in chief of Congressional Quarterly.

[*Comrades!: A History of World Communism*, Robert Service, Harvard University Press, 571 pages]

Opium of the Intellectuals

By Lee Congdon

SINCE THE COLLAPSE of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR, scholars have busied themselves with a wealth of previously restricted archival material. In the process, they have made some important discoveries concerning, for example, Lenin's personal responsibility for mass murder and the Soviet

decision to crush the Hungarian Revolution. But none of this has forced a dramatic rethinking of communist history. As a professor of Russian history at Oxford, Robert Service is aware of this, yet he seems to have believed that the time was right for a scholarly and comprehensive review of communism's career around the world. In *Comrades!: A History of World Communism*, comprehensiveness is the key, as Service seeks to answer a still open question: were there, despite undeniable national differences, enough similarities to justify treating communist parties and states as a single order?

Many thoughtful students of the subject have given "no" as the answer. In their view, Stalin, for example, should be understood as a latter-day Peter the Great or Ivan the Terrible, a "Red Tsar" or an "oriental despot." In other words, Koba belonged to what Tibor Szamuely called "the Russian tradition." Service himself calls our attention to the Sino-Soviet conflict and Vietnam's war against their comrades in Cambodia. Others have pointed out that communist leaders almost invariably sought to identify their regimes with "progressive" traditions in their countries' pasts.

One could lend further support to the nationalist view by observing that communist brotherhood did little or nothing to lessen ethnic hostilities—it only drove them underground. In the 1970s, Hungarians relegated "Bucharest Street" to a remote section of Budapest; they had to pretend to recognize Romanians as comrades, but it was a pretense. Or consider the bad blood that existed between Czechs and Slovaks within the Czechoslovakian Party leadership. General Secretary Antonín Novotný, a Czech, never bothered to disguise his dislike of Slovaks, while Slovak comrades regarded Novotný and the other Czech communists as *Švejsks*—a contemptuous reference to the cunning but passive "good soldier" in Jaroslav Hašek's celebrated novel of World War I.

Although he does not examine these matters point by point, Service wisely concedes, "the national aspects of each

communist order have always been of importance." Yet he argues, "communism's characteristics have been basically similar wherever it has lasted any length of time." And so they have. In virtually every case, one finds one-party dictatorship, adulation of a supreme leader, forced labor camps, expropriation of large sectors of the economy, central economic planning, persecution of religion, destruction or co-optation of intermediate institutions between the state and individuals, vituperative attacks upon designated enemies, and a sadistic political police.

Most importantly, communist regimes have been as one in their ambition to bring heaven to earth, to create a "perfect"—that is an egalitarian—society and a "new man." Peter the Great would not have imagined such a project; Stalin tried to enact it. Without exception, this utopian drive resulted in mass murder on a ghastly scale. Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward alone claimed the lives of some 30 million Chinese.

It is another question whether, as Service maintains, the foundations of the Soviet order, as laid down by Lenin, "lasted unreformed under his successors through to the late 1980s." They did last until 1953, the year Stalin died, but Service's own account of the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev tells a different story. Each retained or sought to retain the one-party system and, with the exception of Gorbachev, was determined to preserve the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe—hence the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the shutting down of the Czechoslovak reform movement known as the Prague Spring. But Khrushchev (in 1956) and Brezhnev (in 1968) acted reluctantly, and their regimes cannot be equated with that of the pitiless Stalin.

After the Man of Steel went to his reward, communism in Eastern Europe began a slow but discernable movement away from the reign of terror. Khrushchev's famous call for de-Stalinization—his "secret speech" to the Party Congress in 1956—only quickened the

pace of change. It brought Wladyslaw Gomulka to power in Poland and Imre Nagy in Hungary. Both men, it is important to note, had been victims of Stalinists in their own countries. As a reformer, Gomulka turned out to be a disappointment, but he was an improvement over his predecessor, Boleslaw Bierut. Nagy had long been a loyal comrade, but as prime minister he stood for far-reaching reforms of the communist system. Even János Kádár, whom Moscow installed to replace Nagy, insisted upon Nagy's execution, but over time Kádár dismantled the terror regime and permitted greater liberty—in part no doubt because he had suffered at the hands of Mátyás Rákosi, Stalin's "best pupil."

To be sure, things moved more slowly in East Germany and post-Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, but even though the regimes in these countries continued to harass and jail dissenters, including the now famous Václav Havel, they did not shoot them. Romania, where the unhinged Nicolae Ceausescu held court, and Albania, where the equally unbalanced Enver Hoxha outlawed all religious observance, were exceptions to the rule. Outraged by Soviet de-Stalinization, the Albanian dictator turned to Mao Zedong for inspiration.

As long as Mao was alive, Chinese communism set the standard for ideological rigidity. A pathological tyrant, the "Great Helmsman," as he preferred to be called, made of China a hell on earth. Service makes this clear, but for some reason, he felt bound to note Mao's "achievements." "In a break with pre-revolutionary culture," he informs us, "nearly all urban inhabitants acquired a bicycle." And Mussolini made the trains run on time, but it was only when the despot departed this world that sanity began to return to the land of Confucius.

Recognizing that the Great Leap Forward and the euphemistically styled Cultural Revolution had been catastrophes, Deng Xiaoping, a veteran communist, charted an ambitious course of renewal. Like so many reformers in Eastern Europe, he had narrowly escaped liquidation for his alleged heresies. In his

seventies, when he assumed power, Deng pressed for rapid economic reform and a "communism with Chinese characteristics." Fearful of unleashing uncontrollable forces, he preserved the one-party state, but advanced a cautious program of political liberalization. As the clouds of fear began to lift, some rashly thought it was safe to express open opposition to the regime.

In the spring of 1989, students and intellectuals occupied Tiananmen Square in Beijing and demanded democracy. Eventually, the government lost patience and suppressed the demonstration decisively. It is not without interest that many of those in the West who continue to express outrage over what they call the Tiananmen "massacre" had either remained silent or demonstrated sympathy as Mao ordered savage reprisals against millions who never challenged his authority.

In fact, Western intellectuals seem to lose interest in communist states that have ceased to project utopian visions and to will them—by means of terror—into being. Those whom Paul Hollander has called political pilgrims stood in line to see the Soviet "experiment" with their own eyes—but only as long as Stalin lived; disappointed by the lack of revolutionary élan under Brezhnev, they removed the USSR from their travel itineraries. Mao attracted them; Deng did not. Ho Chi Minh excited them; his successors hardly at all. Because he still poses as a bold revolutionary, Fidel Castro continues to fascinate. Service himself gives *El Jefe* credit for Cuba's achievements in the medical field, joining the king of pop agitprop, Michael Moore.

Other judgments are open to challenge. Service believes that Sacco and Vanzetti were innocent (though they deserved a new trial, Sacco, at least, was almost certainly guilty); that General Franco and Dr. Salazar were "fascists" (they were traditional authoritarians of the Right); and that Italian Fascism and Nazism were rightist political movements (they were revolutionary movements of the national socialist Left).

Service also argues that the appeal of communism grows “in direct proportion to shortages in food, shelter, employment and chances of individual and collective betterment.” However plausible, such a claim is misleading. It has always been intellectuals, most of whom never experienced poverty, who, in a search for meaning and direction in life, worshipped the god of communism and created in the mass of men an appetite for equality and a belief that they are entitled to it. Because this belief is so widespread, Service may well be right when he predicts that communism, under a new name perhaps, “will have a long afterlife even when the last communist state has disappeared.” ■

Lee Congdon is the author, most recently, of Seeing Red: Hungarian Intellectuals in Exile and the Challenge of Communism.

[Debating Immigration, edited by Carol M. Swain, Cambridge University Press, 316 pages]

Bringing Diversity to the Debate

By Mark Krikorian

Debating Immigration grew out of papers presented at a conference held at Princeton in 2005, plus some additional contributions. The book is thus not animated by a single hypothesis and is therefore perhaps even more difficult to review than is usually the case with collected volumes.

The question becomes, are there enough essays with something useful to say to make it worth reading? The answer is yes.

Given the academy's parochial leftism, such an answer might seem improbable. But the editor, Carol Swain, now at Vanderbilt University, is not your

conventional academic. Born in a rural shack without running water, a high-school dropout who married and had children while still in her teens, and a devout Christian, she was never successfully socialized into political correctness. While not quite a conservative, her views are decidedly heterodox, even heretical, in the context of an elite university. She's argued in previous books that black-majority districts are not good for blacks and that affirmative action and mass immigration should be ended in part because they fuel the growth of white nationalism.

The makeup of this volume is more evidence of Swain's heterodoxy. Sure, the open-borders Left is represented, as it should be in a book entitled *Debating Immigration*, and Swain got some of the top academics of that ilk, including Doug Massey, Linda Bosniak, and Rogers Smith. But if you read the *New York Times*, you already know what they're going to say.

There are also offerings that don't just regurgitate the elite consensus, and these are not just by immigration restrictionists, who are well represented here, including my own director of research, Steven Camarota. More novel are the essays by those, like Swain, who can't really be counted in the restrictionist camp but whose intellectual honesty forces them to confront reality in a way their colleagues do not.

Swain's own chapter builds on her earlier work on black representation and explores how the Congressional Black Caucus fails to represent the economic interests of black Americans on the immigration issue. As she writes, “In the case of immigration reform, African Americans must look beyond the CBC for effective representation. Ironically, white members of Congress have been more of a voice for working people than the CBC, which sometimes operates out of self-interest and embraces a politics of symbolism.” You can say that again.

Along the same lines is an essay by Jonathan Tilove, who has covered race and immigration for more than 15 years. He writes, “indifference to the fate of

black America, or in some quarters a passive-aggressive hostility toward African Americans, has become an animating feature of support for a liberal immigration policy.” He recounts the angry reaction to his collaborations with demographer William Frey in documenting white flight from immigrants, a reaction very different from the response to his reports about white flight from blacks. His interpretation is priceless:

My reading of the unspoken, even unconscious thinking at work goes like this: Of course there was white flight from blacks. Who wouldn't run? But white flight from immigrants? Why would someone run away from immigrants? Blacks are scary. Blacks lower property values. Immigrants aren't scary. Immigrants rehabilitate property values. Immigrants have great restaurants. And so on.

This attitude has been enabled by affirmative action's assumption that “everyone of color is more or less fungible,” leading a black activist to tell Tilove, “I was struck by the number of times employers said to me directly, ‘We want to phase out our blacks and bring in Asians. It keeps us clear in EEO [equal employment opportunity] and gets us better workers.’”

This example brings to light another aspect of this issue: the speaker, then research director for the Chicago Urban League, supported affirmative action for immigrants anyway. It's not just a matter of the black elite being handcuffed by its liberalism; Tilove's sense—and I think he's right—is “support for immigration feels right for many blacks on account of color and their own history of challenging oppression.” The result is what Tilove evocatively calls “a circle of unrequited racial affinity,” in which blacks see themselves as having the most in common with Hispanics, but Hispanics and Asians see themselves as having the most in common with whites. In other words, “While blacks were chasing the Rainbow, Hispanics and Asians were chasing whiteness.”

The book is not all about race, though. The chapters are grouped by broad topics—philosophy and religion, law and policy, economics and demographics, race, and cosmopolitanism—and two of the essays on the moral foundations of immigration policy are notable. One is on a facet of the issue that you won't see in any other academic treatment of immigration—"A Biblical Perspective on Immigration Policy." Authored by James Edwards of the Hudson Institute, the chapter marks a sincere attempt to discern general Biblical principles that should guide the thinking of Christians and Jews in making immigration policy, as well an implicit rebuke to the facile use of Scripture by open-borders advocates.

Edwards notes, "the Bible speaks much more about the treatment of immigrants—that is, the treatment of the stranger, the sojourner, or the foreign resident in our midst—that it does about immigration policy in the sense of the laws and customs that should regulate the influx of foreigners into a settled community." This confusion of *immigrant* policy and *immigration* policy leads many politically active clergymen to misinterpret, for instance, Exodus 22:21, in which God tells Moses at Sinai, "Do not mistreat an alien or oppress him, for you were aliens in Egypt."

Edwards criticizes the use of Scripture by open-borders activists for three reasons: they fail to acknowledge the special obligation we have to those close to us, the obligation that the civil authority has to protect the community in its care, and the harm open borders would cause. Though Edwards doesn't put it quite this way, the Christian auxiliary of the open-borders movement is not engaging in Biblical exegesis to help inform its views but rather "eisegesis," reading into the text things that aren't there.

Another essay approaches the moral parameters of the immigration issue from a secular perspective. Stephen Macedo from Princeton examines the thinking of John Rawls and Michael Walzer in making a case for having an obligation to our fellow citizens that's greater than our obli-

gation to humanity as a whole. The chapter is sensible, accessible, and worth reading. What's remarkable is not his conclusion, which is simply taken for granted by most normal people, but rather his defensive crouch. Edwards doesn't face the same problem because what I call post-Americanism, the notion that nationhood is passé, is rare in Christian circles outside the pink fringe of the mainline religious bureaucracy. Academia is something else all together, making it necessary for Macedo to warn that his commonsensical conclusion will be "controversial" and to reassure the reader that he really, truly is a left-winger.

Another worthwhile contribution is by political scientists Noah Pickus of Duke and Peter Skerry of Boston College. Their claim is that the legal/illegal and citizen/non-citizen dichotomies aren't as important as they might seem from the public debate. The immigrant's formal legal status is a matter between him and the state, a "vertical" relationship, as the authors put it. Important though that is, Pickus and Skerry argue that what's being overlooked is the "horizontal" relationship the immigrant has with his neighbors. And that horizontal relationship colors much of the debate, even though it's expressed in vertical terms. In other words, politicians and the public will complain about "illegal immigration" but then list a variety of problems (hospitals, schools, community disorder) that are caused by immigrants of all kinds, both illegal and legal:

Most Americans are less worried about immigrants having proper documents or being able to answer questions about American history and politics than their behaving like responsible members of the community. Are immigrants making too much noise? Are they attempting to communicate in English? Are they parking their cars where there is supposed to be grass? Are they crowding too many people into their living quarters? ... In sum, we believe that when Americans complain about immigrants, their con-

cern is less about immigrants failing to be good *citizens* than about their failing to be good *neighbors*.

The broad point that the legal/illegal issue isn't as important as it's made out to be strikes me as correct, though it can be taken too far—part of being a good neighbor is not sneaking into my house and then demanding that I accommodate you. Likewise, the authors go too far in their policy suggestions by endorsing a proposal floated in California that amounts to state-run amnesty for illegal aliens. Nonetheless, Pickus and Skerry look at immigration from a perspective not usually found in the debate, and one can't help but learn from their essay.

These are the highlights, but there is more in the volume. Yale law professor Peter Schuck looks at the large gap in the views between elites and the public on this issue from the perspective of a supporter of mass immigration who nonetheless takes seriously the concerns of the public. Communitarian guru Amitai Etzioni disappoints with a wrong-headed discussion of how Hispanic and Asian immigrants "are reinforcing the weakened communal elements of the American society" and how they will blur the color line and move us away from identity politics. Nathan Glazer wrote the wrap-up essay, seeming to conclude, *à la* his book *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*, that probably nothing we are willing to do can stop immigration, so we "might do well to consider how we can guide it rather than staunch it."

Be that as it may, this is a useful book for the concerned citizen who knows the basics about immigration and wants to hone his thinking. Carol Swain should be applauded for daring to gather a genuine diversity of views at an elite university and then publishing it at an elite academic press. If the concerns of the public over immigration are trickling up, ever so slowly, not just into the halls of Congress but into academia itself, maybe there's hope for America yet. ■

Mark Krikorian is executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies.

The Lost Summer



This is for us oldies. Remember when the summers lasted longer back then, when all men seemed to wear hats, and women acted like ladies?

My best summer ever was 1952, when I came to New York from Blair Academy and my father informed me we were leaving for the south of France via ocean liner. I was 15 and terribly eager to lose my virginity. What better place than the fabled land of F. Scott Fitzgerald and the Murphys? I read *Tender is the Night* while crossing on the *Constitution*, the latest in comfort, speed and elegance where liners were concerned. After staying up all night with a girl from Texas—Isla was her name, and I was truly smitten—I watched as we approached Cannes from the West. The twin towers of the Carlton Hotel—reputed to be exact copies of the breasts of La Belle Ottero, a famous grand horizontal—was the first thing I saw in the horizon. The place was green, unbuilt, and reeked of sex, adventure, and romance.

I will never forget driving from Cannes to the Hotel du Cap, the model F. Scott used in *Tender*, which he called Josse Hotel. I spent the whole summer there, going to Juan les Pins to listen to Sidney Bechet at night, dancing until dawn at the summer casino of Monte Carlo, and meeting people who in my 15-year-old mind were as fabulous as any I had read about in Fitzgerald's fiction.

By the time I had to return to boarding school, I was a broken man. I had discovered fast girls, gambling, drinking, and all the other vices one associates with having a good time. My mother was appalled and couldn't wait for August to

end. The trip back, again on the *Constitution*, was like being given the royal suite at the world's greatest hotel while waiting to die in the electric chair.

I went back to the Riviera five years later, after I was through with schooling, and it was still a magic place. Then, year after year, the place got more crowded, more built up, and, worst of all, the world's nouveaux riches began to arrive with a vengeance.

By 1977, I had had enough. I moved my summer operations to the Greek Isles, and after those followed the Riviera's example, it was time for good old Helvetia—Gstaad to be exact, where I

I SPENT THE SUMMER GOING TO JUAN LES PINS TO LISTEN TO SIDNEY BECHET, DANCING UNTIL DAWN AT THE SUMMER CASINO OF MONTE CARLO, AND MEETING PEOPLE AS FABULOUS AS ANY I HAD READ ABOUT IN FITZGERALD'S FICTION.

watched cows graze, breathed clean air, and bored myself stiff. Four years ago, I built myself a boat and came back where I had started from. It was like meeting Isla after all these years. To say I was disappointed would be a gross understatement.

And yet, further west from Antibes and Cannes, St. Tropez has held out the longest against the invading hordes of Arabs and Russkies. The rest of the Riviera is now a sweaty, dangerous hellhole, its polluted waters matched only by the polluted kleptocrats who inhabit the place. St. Tropez proper is clean and

charming, its tiny cobbled streets unchanged, its bistros and places where the locals play Boule exactly the same they were 50 years ago.

Yet horrors come from the sea: megayachts that look like refrigerators on steroids. The colossal arrogance is mind boggling. The most recent arrivals are Pakistanis, whose specialty is to pop open magnums of Cristal champagne in the Cave des Rois and pour the contents out on the floor down to the last drop at 50,000 Euros a shot. And it gets worse. People cheer while they're doing it. Remember this the next time your tax dollars go to that miserable land.

This is what has happened to my beloved St. Tropez, once a sleepy fishing village port full of sleek and beautiful sailing boats, now full of monstrosities chartered by oily types who mistreat

women and waiters. Like the movies we watch, the music we listen to, and the people we see on megayachts and getting off their private jets, it's all very, very vulgar.

Poor old F. Scott. One look today would cure him of his fascination with the rich once and for all.

Still, by staying away from the port and anchoring off the Bismarck house high up in the hills, I have managed to have the best summer in many a year. It could be worse. I could be back in the Hamptons with Puff Daddy and his merry band. ■



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